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INSEPARABLE USES* 
MARK VERSTRAETE** 
There is widespread debate over whether and to what extent a person should 
control personal information. This Article provides clarity to the terms and 
stakes of this debate. First, it lays out a new, normative foundation for the 
importance of control in data protection regimes, as well as for determining the 
limits of control after personal data is transferred. The central claim is that 
personal data—as well as other unique cases that this Article identifies—retains 
a connection to the person even after they no longer control it. This Article 
analyzes the philosophical concept of separability, which provides conceptual 
clarity for parsing when and to what degree legal mechanisms should give people 
control over information that describes them. While separable uses do not raise 
normatively relevant issues of control, when personal data is used inseparably, 
the use risks violating basic deontological maxims—such as refraining from using 
a person as a means to an end. Such violations undermine human dignity. As a 
result, policymakers should craft legal rules that allow individuals to control 
inseparable uses of their personal data. 
This Article transcends previous accounts of separability that fail to recognize 
that separability often turns principally on how the potential thing is used, not 
on some fundamental feature of the thing. This Article offers a new model of 
separability that fully accounts for the normative significance of use. This 
innovative account of separability yields practical benefits by casting new light 
on an array of puzzles from information law and property law. In information 
law, separability provides normative grounding for use restrictions of personal 
data that do not fall prey to the traps of purpose limitations. Separability also 
provides important insights into property theory and debates over alienability. 
For instance, it casts new light on the debate over the alienability of rights of 
publicity. It also determines the boundaries of “moral rights” in copyright, which 
provide artists with legal mechanisms of control over their creative works that 
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persist after these works are sold. And finally, separability resolves several 
challenges in the debate over deepfakes by more clearly delineating the interests 
that people have in uses of their image. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The appropriate limits of control that people retain over their personal 
information are deeply contested among scholars and policymakers. While the 
scope of many privacy rules is under debate and subject to revision, current 
privacy legislation reflects a sweeping array of rules granting consumers rights 
of control over their information. Some “control regimes” provide data subjects 
with deletion rights that allow a person to force platform firms to delete their 
personal information.1 Others grant use restrictions that prevent firms from 
using personal information for new purposes without the consumer’s consent.2 
Even so, in some of the most common control regimes, there is little consensus 
over whether these rules are desirable and which foundational principles justify 
their existence. 
This Article argues that the crux of this confusion stems from the central 
(and correct) intuition that a person retains a normatively significant 
connection to their personal information even after they relinquish control over 
it. This often overlooked intuition continues to drive proposals for information 
policy. 3 Most commonly, the fact that an individual’s personal information 
retains a connection to that person leads scholars to gravitate toward property 
 
 1. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a) (2020) (“A 
consumer shall have the right to request that a business delete any personal information about the 
consumer which the business has collected from the consumer.”); Regulation 2016/679, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) art. 17(1) [hereinafter GDPR] 
(“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data 
concerning him or her without undue delay . . . .”). 
 2. GDPR, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(b) (Personal data shall be “collected for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes 
. . . .”). In addition, the Fair Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”)—which often guide 
information policy—include purpose limitations as a core provision. Purpose limitations require that 
data holders do not use information for purposes that did not motivate the initial collection. The 
seminal source for the FIPPs is widely considered the HEW Report. See generally SEC’Y’S ADVISORY 
COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, 
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973) [hereinafter HEW REPORT] 
(recommending the enactment of a federal code of fair information practices that rests on five basic 
principles to safeguard personal data).  
 3. Often commentators and legislators default to property-talk when recognizing the significant 
relationship that connects people to their personal information. Different proposals that grant 
“property rights” to data subjects have gained traction in recent years. See, e.g., Salomé Viljoen, Data 
as a Democratic Medium: From Individual to Relational Data Governance 44–49 (Aug. 31, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (describing the political 
economy of property rights proposals for personal data). One salient example of this phenomenon is 
Andrew Yang’s “data dividend,” which would create property rights in personal data. Makena Kelly, 
Andrew Yang Is Pushing Big Tech To Pay Users for Data, VERGE (June 22, 2020, 10:00 
AM),  https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/22/21298919/andrew-yang-big-tech-data-dividend-project-
facebook-google-ubi [https://perma.cc/F92Y-Q6BD (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
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regimes in personal information.4 Yet property regimes in personal data are 
largely unworkable both pragmatically and theoretically and thus provide a poor 
pathway to securing ongoing control over information. 5  Property rights 
conceptually rely on alienability, which would undermine the ability of people 
to control their information after transfer and give companies that process data 
greater mechanisms of control than they currently enjoy. 6  Further, the 
connection that exists between people and their data is not necessarily a property 
relation.7 Ultimately, scholars and policymakers are forced into an apparent 
bind: either we grant property rights in data which leads to undesirable 
normative and conceptual outcomes or we abandon the intuitive and 
foundational notion of a connection that links a person to their data. 
By undertaking a rigorous analysis of the relationship that a person has 
with their personal data, this Article offers a way out of this bind—a new 
normative foundation for control over information that does not rest on 
property rights. Rather than defaulting to a property model, this analysis 
focuses on separability as the cornerstone for developing a governing regime for 
information privacy. Inseparable uses potentially violate basic deontological 
principles.8 More specifically, these uses risk dignity violations because they 
contravene fundamental principles in Immanuel Kant’s deontological moral 
philosophy: a person should neither be treated as a thing nor used merely as a 
means to an end.9 This Article uses separability to distinguish between uses that 
 
 4. Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2056 (2004) 
(offering a property-style approach to the regulation of personal data); Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy 
as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1126–27 (2016) (conceptualizing privacy through the lens of 
property entitlements). Beyond academia, regulators often reach for property models to govern 
personal data. For instance, Senator John Kennedy recently introduced a bill that would provide 
property rights in personal data. Own Your Own Data Act of 2019, S. 806, 116th Cong. (2019). 
Similarly, California Governor Gavin Newsom floated the idea of a “data dividend” that is premised 
on user property rights over their data. See Jill Cowan, How Much Is Your Data Worth?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/us/newsom-hertzberg-data-dividend.html 
[https://perma.cc/HR3G-2NNY (dark archive)] (discussing Governor Newsom’s proposal). 
 5. Pamela Samuelson offers one of the canonical criticisms of promoting privacy with a property 
regime. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1137–39 (2000); see 
also Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1301 (2000) 
(offering a critique of property approaches to privacy); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational 
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (2000) (same). 
 6. Litman, supra note 5, at 1295–96 (arguing that property facilitates transfers rather than 
restricts them); Cohen, supra note 5, at 1375–76. 
 7. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1378 (“[T]he understanding of ownership that applies to, say, cars or 
shoes just seems a crabbed and barren way of measuring the importance of information that describes 
or reveals personality.”). 
 8. Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/ [https://perma.cc/8LPT-W9A2] (Oct. 17, 
2016). 
 9. IMMANUEL KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN (1785), reprinted in 
GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46–47 (Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., 2002) 
[hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK]. 
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merely appropriate the thing and uses that appropriate the personal connection 
(and person) inherent in the thing. Uses that appropriate the person often use 
the person as merely a means to an end and, by extension, are normatively 
suspect. 
Separability departs from a traditional property theory of information 
control because it recognizes the descriptive and normative significance of 
inalienability. 10  Descriptively, separability identifies a person’s interest in 
potential uses of their data that are not extinguished after transfer. Unlike 
typical commodities, personal data (and the other cases examined in this 
Article) have an inalienable connection to the person even after they are 
physically alienated or transferred. Here, separability performs invaluable 
conceptual work in locating the boundary between persons and things and 
identifying specific uses that remain connected to the person. 
Normatively, this Article argues that we should legislate rules that give 
legal weight to these inalienable interests. To that end, separability identifies a 
principle—an inseparable use potentially uses the person, rather than a 
particular thing, and thus violates deontological maxims that prohibit both 
treating a person as a thing and using a person as merely a means to an end. 
This interest is similar in kind to the interest that a person has in controlling 
the use of their body parts. A person may reasonably consent to some uses, but 
(in most cases) they cannot and should not be able to irrevocably alienate uses 
of their body. Inseparable uses of personal information commit a similar type 
of wrong to the person as unconsented uses of their body. This conceptual 
analogue leads separability toward granting informational rights that provide 
similar rights of control as those to which a person retains over their body. 
This Article also provides a key contribution to the debate over 
separability and the distinction between persons and things. This distinction is 
particularly salient for moral philosophy and property theory. Again, the 
conceptual distinction between persons and things determines the content of 
our moral obligations under Kantian (deontological) moral philosophy. 11 
Similarly, recent neo-essentialist work in property theory has attempted to 
move beyond the legal realist understanding of property as legal relations 
 
 10. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (1987) (discussing 
one type of inalienability that restricts markets transfers) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability]; 
Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1405–06 (2009) (discussing the 
relationship between inalienability rules and efficiency); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the 
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931–33 (1985) (providing a taxonomy of different 
types of inalienability). 
 11. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 9, at 46; David P. Ellerman, The Kantian Person/Thing 
Principle in Political Economy, 22 J. ECON. ISSUES 1109, 1110 (1988); Adam Bjorndahl, Alex John 
London & Kevin J. S. Zollman, Kantian Decision Making Under Uncertainty, PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT, 
Apr. 2017, at 1. 
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between people and instead argues that property is a legal right to a thing.12 In 
order to adequately facilitate their theoretical goals, neo-essentialist visions of 
property require some demarcation between persons and things.13 
However, previous accounts of separability in both moral philosophy and 
property theory falter because they collectively fail to recognize that 
separability often turns on use of a thing, rather than some characteristic 
fundamental to the thing. 14  A renewed focus on use better distinguishes 
between persons and things. This focus remedies previous conceptual errors and 
allows separability to faithfully track its normative commitments. 
Under this Article’s renewed theory of separability, a use must meet two 
conditions to be inseparable. First, the thing that is used must retain a 
connection to a specific person. Some connections dissipate upon alienation or 
transfer and do not satisfy this condition. This dissipation is common for 
paradigmatic commodities, such as cars: once a car is transferred, the link 
between the previous owner is almost always exhausted. Other things retain 
connections that survive transfer, such as personal data. However, a continuing 
connection is not sufficient for inseparability. Rather, the use must rely on the 
personal connection and affect that person. For instance, an inseparable use of 
personal data necessarily relies on the personal connection inherent in the 
information in order to affect the person about whom the data refers.  
This Article applies separability to a unique set of things—such as body 
parts, publicity rights, creative works, and personal data—that retain a 
connection to a specific person even after they are transferred. Inseparable uses 
depend on the connection linking the person to the thing. This Article argues 
that people retain an inalienable deontological interest in controlling 
inseparable uses of a thing even after it is transferred. 
Most prominently, this Article uses separability to solve several puzzles 
within information law. Privacy statutes commonly draw distinctions between 
personal information and nonpersonal information.15 However, there is little 
consensus about the demarcation between personal information and 
 
 12. Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183, 186 (2017). 
 13. Wyman carefully maps conceptual attempts in property theory to distinguish between 
persons and things. Id. at 197. This distinction is fundamental to Essentialist visions of property theory 
because property is control over “things” that are distinct and separable from persons. See id. at 194. 
 14. See infra Section I.B. 
 15. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally 
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011). As Schwartz and Solove recognize, federal 
statutes define the scope of privacy harms through the lens of personal information. Id. Examples 
include the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 
1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.), the Video Privacy 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710), and the 
HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
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nonpersonal information.16 Separability provides conceptual clarity about this 
distinction. The line distinguishing these two concepts should turn on (1) 
whether the information is connected to the person and (2) how it is used. Not 
only does separability provide conceptual clarity, but it also more faithfully 
tracks the normative considerations motivating legislators to distinguish 
between these types of information in the first place. 
In addition, separability provides a normative foundation for crafting use 
restrictions over personal data. Although use restrictions are a staple of 
information privacy laws, they often reflexively incorporate purpose 
limitations—cabining uses of information to the purpose for which it was 
originally collected. 17  This Article argues that use restrictions based on 
separability, rather than purpose limitations, are a better response to the 
potential normative issues inherent in using personal data. In particular, 
separability identifies uses of information that are connected to specific people 
where, by virtue of their connection, people should have some control over how 
that information is used. 
Alongside information law, separability provides crucial insights into 
debates over the scope and content of alienability restrictions in property law. 
Consider the debate over the assignability of publicity rights. In a foundational 
article, Jennifer Rothman argues that publicity rights should be inalienable 
because of their inherent connection to the person whose image is exploited 
commercially. 18  However, different uses have different degrees of 
connectedness to the person. Further, separability identifies the uses that are 
more robustly entwined with the person and thus justify granting some limits 
on alienability. 19  As a result, limitations on alienability should focus on 
inseparable uses rather than less nuanced and more general restrictions on 
alienability.20 This approach allows society to retain the benefits of assignability 
while sidestepping potential normative pitfalls that accompany these transfers. 
Finally, this Article mobilizes separability to solve challenges posed by 
transfers of genetic material and creative works. Like information and publicity 
rights, the scope of control rights for both genetic material and creative works 
are contested. For instance, can a sperm donor revoke consent and block 
 
 16. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 15, at 1828–36 (discussing the lack of uniformity in definitions 
of personal information). 
 17. See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at xx–xxi (discussing purpose limitations); Marc Rotenberg, 
Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 10–11 (2001). 
 18. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 226 (2012) (“[O]ne’s 
identity—including its representation in one’s name, likeness, voice, and other indicia—is not 
detachable from the underlying person. Without any possibility of separation, the alienation of 
publicity rights should not only be disfavored, it is not possible.”). 
 19. See infra Section III.A.3. 
 20. See infra Section III.A.3. 
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unwanted future uses of their reproductive material to procreate? Alternatively, 
what if the sperm donor merely donated the sample for medical research? 
Separability is crucial in parsing these different cases along firm deontological 
commitments. Separability identifies the uses of these things that are linked to 
the person and where, by extension, the person has strong normative claims to 
exercise legal control over uses. 
The rest of this Article unfolds as follows. Part I explains the normative 
work that separability performs and sketches where previous accounts of 
separability have gone awry. Part II introduces a novel account of separability 
that recognizes the importance of use for determinations of separability. In 
doing so, it offers a conceptual account that more faithfully tracks the normative 
stakes that separability serves. Part III applies this novel account of separability 
to resolve several puzzles in property and information law. In particular, 
separability provides crucial insight into the appropriate limits of control that a 
person may exercise over genetic material, creative works, rights of publicity, 
and personal data. 
I.  MARKING THE EDGES OF SEPARABILITY 
This part maps the rough terrain around normative and conceptual 
features of separability. Section I.A explores the normative stakes of 
separability. Moral philosophers invoke separability to demarcate the boundary 
of the person.21 Broadly, things are distinguished from people because a thing 
can be separable from a person. The ontological distinction between persons 
and things is essential to Kantian ethical theory because it determines our 
different obligations in the world.22 The duties we owe people are different than 
the ones that we owe mere things.23 This insight grounds the Kantian ethical 
requirement to never use a person as merely a means to an end.24 Stated another 
way, when we use a person as a thing, we fail to appreciate the person’s inherent 
dignity.25 
 
 21. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 41, at 73 (Allen W. Wood 
ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991); IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 124 (Louis Infield trans., 
1930) [hereinafter KANT, LECTURES]; J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 111 (1997); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 972 (1982) [hereinafter Radin, 
Property]. 
 22. Bjorndahl et al., supra note 11, at 1 (“There is something compelling in the idea that there is a 
fundamental moral difference between persons and things, and that a significant portion of ethics is 
concerned with ensuring that our treatment of ourselves and others reflects this distinction. Kantian 
ethics places this intuitively appealing idea at the center of its moral system.”). 
 23. Id. at 4–5. 
 24. Id. There is extensive literature on the precise contours of Kant’s restriction on using people 
as merely a means. See Alexander A. Guerrero, Appropriately Using People Merely as a Means, 10 CRIM. 
L. & PHIL. 774, 779–80 (2016) (discussing this literature). 
 25. 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS 212 (2011). 
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Section I.B considers how different conceptual accounts of separability 
map to the background normative commitments that separability often 
supports. Both moral philosophers and property theorists have attempted to 
refine the conceptual boundaries of separability.26 This section focuses most 
closely on two plausible theories of separability: separability as physical 
separation and separability as contingency. Ultimately, I argue that both 
accounts suffer from fatal errors that force these theories to deviate from the 
normative commitments that separability serves. 
It is worth noting, however, that property theorists have relied on 
separability for slightly different ends than what this Article offers. Property 
theorists often depend on separability to determine which things can be the 
subject of property claims rather than focusing on the normative stakes inherent 
in an analysis of separability. 27  That said, there is some natural overlap. 
Property tends to disfavor downstream restrictions, so identifying the 
boundaries of property implicitly recognizes a situation where people have 
limited rights over controlling uses of a thing after it is transferred.28 This 
Article is primarily concerned with identifying specific instances of uses that 
violate deontological values such that the person has a recognizable interest in 
controlling these uses even after they transfer the thing. 
A. The Normative Structure of Separability 
Philosophical approaches to separability largely serve to distinguish 
between persons and things. This distinction is necessary because philosophers 
recognize that control over the external world, through property claims over 
things, is generally necessary and beneficial.29 Property promotes autonomy 
through stable expectations of control and use.30 Complex projects inevitably 
use many things that cannot be physically controlled simultaneously. For 
instance, property rights allow a construction company to retain control over all 
 
 26. See HEGEL, supra note 21, § 41, at 73; KANT, LECTURES, supra note 21, at 124; PENNER, supra 
note 21, at 111; Radin, Property, supra note 21, at 972. 
 27. PENNER, supra note 21, at 111 (discussing his vision of separability and the work it performs 
in restricting the scope of permissible property claims); see also Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of 
Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 48 (2009) (discussing Penner’s account of separability in property 
theory). 
 28. For the canonical work on downstream restrictions on property, see generally Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928). However, recent 
commentators have also taken up the problems introduced by Chafee. See Glen O. Robinson, Personal 
Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (2004) (examining the distinction between real 
property servitudes and personal property servitudes); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New 
Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 915 (2008). 
 29. HEGEL, supra note 21, § 41, at 73 (claiming that property allows people to actualize their will 
in the external world); see also Radin, Property, supra note 21, at 972 (discussing this passage from 
Hegel). 
 30. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2012) 
(discussing the purposes of the property system). 
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the constituent parts of a bridge that it is building without exercising physical 
possession of them. These rights over the external world—that apply even in 
the absence of control—promote freedom and human flourishing.31 
At the same time, however, the scope of permissible property claims is not 
unlimited. Philosophers—most notably G.W.F. Hegel and Immanuel Kant—
argue that property rights are only permissible in things that are external to the 
self.32 This limitation performs important normative work because it prevents 
the mechanisms of control inherent in the property system from applying to 
persons. 33  This Article highlights how this overapplication of property is 
normatively problematic. 
The Hegelian theory of property grapples with the tension between the 
need for property and the need for a limiting principle for property claims.34 
Hegel recognizes that some system of property is necessary because it allows 
individuals to actualize their desires in the world.35 Yet Hegel also claims that 
normatively defensible property claims are not appropriate in any universal 
element of one’s self.36 These property claims turn something that is essential 
to the person into the property of another.37 Hegel goes on to argue against 
slavery on these grounds, claiming that slavery alienates the personality and 
turns it into the property of another.38 While Hegel could be slightly more 
explicit about the wrongs that follow from granting property rights in the self, 
the uneasiness appears to rest on the fact that these property claims transfer 
 
 31. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 333–34 (1988) 
[hereinafter Hughes, Philosophy]. 
 32. See HEGEL, supra note 21, § 67, at 97; see also Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions 
and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 359 (1993) 
(“In Continental liberalism, the subject-object dichotomy emanates from the writings of Kant and 
Hegel, who posited that a conceptual separation between person and external thing is requisite to 
freedom, self-actualization and moral responsibility.”). 
 33. Kant rejects the application of property to people because it is inconsistent with the 
fundamental ethical norm that requires a person to treat another person as an end in themselves rather 
than as a means. Property for Kant is partially about identifying the set of things that can be used by 
people to further their goals. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 90 (2009). Ripstein also acknowledges that the “relation of property to 
setting and pursuing purposes underlies both its rationale and its structure.” Id. at 91. Of course, then, 
the ability to use property merely as a means limits valid property claims to things rather than people. 
 34. Hegel claims that self-actualization requires a sphere where people can exercise control over 
objects in the world. HEGEL, supra note 21, § 41, at 73. At the same time, however, property claims 
cannot permissibly extend to the person (or personality) because this would limit absolute freedom by 
turning one’s self into the property of another. Id. §§ 66–67, at 95–97.  
 35. Dudley Knowles, Hegel on Property and Personality, 33 PHIL. Q. 45, 57 (1983); see also Hughes, 
Philosophy, supra note 31, at 333 (“Acting upon things is an initial step in the ongoing struggle for self-
actualization. Socially mandated property rights do not trigger this self-actualization; they are only a 
means to protect the individual’s initial attempt to take command of the world.”). 
 36. HEGEL, supra note 21, §§ 65–66, at 95. 
 37. Id. § 67, at 97. 
 38. Id. § 66, at 96. 
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control over the person to another individual, thus potentially undermining, 
rather than promoting, autonomy.39 
Kant is more explicit about the normative foundations underlying 
separability. For example, Kant depends on separability to navigate conceptual 
difficulties that attend capturing the benefits of property (or use of things) 
while also remaining faithful to our positive obligations in how we treat 
ourselves and each other. 40  However, Kant’s ability to distinguish between 
persons and things transcends property and is a foundational principle in his 
moral philosophy because it shapes the content of our moral obligations.41 More 
specifically, the characterization of some entity as a person or thing determines 
its source of value and our collective duties toward that entity.42 
Some background on Kant’s moral philosophy is necessary to understand 
the normative valence inherent in his view of separability. Kant divides the 
world into two entities (persons and things) that are distinguished according to 
their worth and source of value.43 Persons have dignity and derive their value 
from their rationality.44 In describing persons Kant says, “[R]ational beings . . . 
are called persons, because their nature already marks them out as ends in 
themselves, i.e., as something that may not be used merely as a means . . . .”45 
For Kant, the rationality of persons generates their moral worth and requires 
that people are treated as ends rather than means.46 Rationality allows a person 
to deliberate and make moral choices for themselves, providing a source of 
inherent worth and value, thus making persons ends in themselves.47 
Standing in conceptual opposition to rational persons are things, which do 
not have the capacity for reason.48 Without reasoning capacities, things are 
 
 39. Radin claims that both Kant and Hegel justify property on the grounds that it promotes 
“freedom and actualization of the person.” Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 10, at 1891. 
 40. KANT, LECTURES, supra note 21, at 124. 
 41. Bjorndahl et al., supra note 11, at 1. 
 42. Id. at 3. 
 43. In distinguishing persons and things, Kant references the divergent sources of value for 
persons and things. Persons derive their worth from their rationality, while things only have value 
insofar as they contribute to the projects of people. Dieter Schonecker & Elke Elisabath Schmidt, 
Kant’s Ground-Thesis: On Dignity and Value in the Groundwork, 52 J. VALUE INQUIRY 81, 85–86 (2017), 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-017-9603-z [https://perma.cc/X5R7-TE63]. Further, 
a person is degraded when they are reduced to a thing which is merely used to further the interests of 
someone else. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 9, at 52–53. Bjorndahl, London, and Zollman also 
single out this foundation of Kant’s writing. Bjorndahl et al., supra note 11, at 3. They claim that Kant 
“distinguish[es] the status of beings with dignity from the worth of things with price.” Id. Further, they 
note that “[t]he value of things with a price derives from, and is therefore conditional upon and relative 
to, the ends of agents.” Id. 
 44. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 9, at 52–53. 
 45. Id. at 46. 
 46. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 110–11 (1996). 
 47. See JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 192 (Barbara 
Herman ed., 2000). 
 48. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 9, at 46. 
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limited to instrumental, rather than inherent, value. 49  While persons have 
inherent moral worth—what Kant calls “dignity”—in virtue of their rational 
capabilities, things do not have inherent value.50 Instead, the value of things is 
purely instrumental; that is, they have value insofar as they are used in service 
of the goals of persons.51 
Things and property have an analytical symmetry that limits property 
claims to things, rather than legitimately extending to include property rights 
over persons. Under Kant’s theory of property, it is perfectly permissible and 
desirable that a person use their property as a means to an end.52 As Arthur 
Ripstein explains, “[T]he right to have something as your own is the right to be 
able to have it as your means, that is, to decide the purposes for which it will be 
used.” 53  Again, the value of the property system and specific incidents of 
property is that it is used to facilitate the goals and projects of persons.54 It is 
not unreasonable to consider property and things as nearly interchangeable. Not 
all things are necessarily property, yet property is necessarily control over 
things. 
Returning to Kant’s moral prescriptions, the Humanity Formula requires 
that a person “[a]ct so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in 
the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as 
means.”55 Violations of this maxim fail to recognize the inherent dignity of 
persons and reduce them to a mere thing. Creating property entitlements in the 
person violates the Humanity Formula because property is subject to the 
control of another person who often uses property as merely a means to an 
end. 56  The normative impermissibility of property claims in persons is 
grounded in the idea that when something is property it can be used in service 
of the property owners’ goals without considering the interests of others. 57 
 
 49. Id. at 52–53. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. RIPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 99 (explaining that under Kant’s theory of property, a person is 
entitled to use a thing as merely a means to an end, and that property defines the scope of permissible 
means for a person to use to achieve their desired ends). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 9, at 46–47. 
 56. For instance, Kant’s rejection of property claims in the body can only be fully understood in 
light of the distinction between persons and things. A person has dignity, and because a person’s body 
(and its parts) constitute the person, it also has dignity. Exercising property claims over body parts 
treats them as mere things, which degrades the person. Property claims degrade the person because 
they necessarily subject the person to the needs and desires of the person who controls the property 
claims. See Nicole Gerrand, The Misuse of Kant in the Debate About a Market for Human Body Parts, 16 J. 
APPLIED PHIL. 59, 64 (1999). 
 57. RIPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 90; see also Stephen R. Munzer, Kant and Property Rights in Body 
Parts, 6 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 319, 322 (1993) (“[T]o recognize or exercise property rights in body 
parts is to degrade persons and their bodies, which is to thrust, or to attempt to thrust, them into a 
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Therefore, the problems of property in the person are principally about the 
potential to use the person, rather than undesirable outcomes that follow from 
crafting property entitlements in the first instance. 
As the next section discusses, earlier accounts of separability fail to 
faithfully identify when the person is being used from more innocuous 
situations where merely a thing is being used. 
B. Conceptual Strategies for Determining Separability 
This section details previous strategies for determining separability and, 
by extension, identifying the boundary between persons and things. In doing 
so, this section details three approaches to separability. First, this section 
demonstrates the inherent problems with failing to offer a rigorous conceptual 
analysis of separability, or separability as tautology. Separability as tautology 
simply claims that something is separable when it is separate from the person. 
This approach falters for several reasons and potentially leads to legislative fiat 
supplanting robust normative considerations. 
Next, this section examines separability as physical separation, which 
claims separability is determined by whether a thing is physically connected to 
the person. Separability as physical separation counts Kant and Margaret Jane 
Radin among its adherents. Ultimately, separability-as-physical-separation fails 
to track the normative values that underlie separability because physical 
separation does not fully determine situations where the person is mistreated, 
which risks overinclusion and underinclusion in several significant cases. 
Finally, this section examines the most compelling account of separability 
to date. Property theorist J.E. Penner claims that a thing is separable from the 
person when it “might just as well be someone else’s.”58 Penner’s criteria delimit 
separability according to whether the thing is necessarily or contingently 
connected to the person. 59  However, separability as contingency fails to 
recognize that contingency is often determined by how the thing is used, rather 
than some inherent feature of the thing. 
1.  Separability as Tautology 
Hegel depends on separability to demarcate the boundary of normative 
permissible property claims because separability distinguishes subject from 
object.60 Hegel insists that only things with an external nature are adequate for 
 
lower level, grade, rank, position, status, or degree than they should occupy. Such recognition or 
exercise, it may be said, involves treating persons, their bodies, or parts of their bodies as, say, ‘things’ 
or ‘objects.’” (emphasis omitted)). 
 58. PENNER, supra note 21, at 112. 
 59. Id. at 111. 
 60. HEGEL, supra note 21, § 65, at 95, § 67, at 97. 
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property claims.61 Yet Hegel merely provides loose guidelines to determine 
which things are external to the person, claiming only that external things have 
an existence independent of our will.62 
Worse still, Hegel seems to simply reiterate that something separable 
exists separately from the person, risking tautology. 63 The lack of a robust 
conceptual structure leads to many borderline cases that cannot be resolved by 
logic alone.64 For example, Hegel argues that wage labor is an alienable property 
right, yet it is not obvious that our labor exists independently of our will.65 
The inherent flexibility in Hegel’s distinction between persons and things 
has drawn an array of criticism.66 Most importantly, the lack of thick criteria to 
parse difficult cases leads to underdetermination; that is, other values or 
considerations are driving the distinction between persons and things, rather 
than the conceptual force of separability.67 As Neil Netanel sharply explains: 
Because the categorization of an attribute as a subject or object is 
somewhat arbitrary, commentators, legislators and courts can make 
classifications based on the result they believe is desirable. When they 
believe that an interest should be alienable, they say that it is an external 
thing, susceptible to ownership, acquisition and transfer. When they 
think that it should be subject to significant alienability restrictions, they 
often characterize it as a personal right, an intrinsic part of the self.68 
The haziness of the distinction between persons and things gives legal 
institutions considerable latitude over how to classify ambiguous cases.69 As a 
result, Hegel’s criteria for separability are largely underdetermined. 70  For 
example, Hegel’s criteria fail to provide much guidance for borderline cases, 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Netanel, supra note 32, at 361 (“To be certain, the liberal delimination of the border 
between the self and the external world are hardly etched in stone. One reason is that the consequences 
of a particular subject-object distinction are not always intuitively obvious.”); see also Radin, Market-
Inalienability, supra note 10, at 1894. 
 63. Netanel, supra note 32, at 360. 
 64. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 10, at 1894 (discussing how the market imperative—
rather than the subject/object distinction—led Hegel to consider wage labor external to the person and 
alienable). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Netanel, supra note 32, at 361. 
 67. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 10, at 1895. The Legal Realists criticized 
underdetermination of legal outcomes more broadly. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 
CALIF. L. REV. 465, 472 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 
(1986)). 
 68. Netanel, supra note 32, at 362. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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including the cases that this Article considers such as body parts, 71 creative 
works,72 publicity rights,73 and personal data.74 
Often, actors that are politically dominant will determine whether a thing 
falls on the subject or object side of the dichotomy.75 The normative upshot is 
that political power will inevitably determine the limits of control that a person 
can exercise over these boundary cases. For example, because firms that derive 
their profit from harvesting and processing consumer data wield more political 
power than data subjects, it is not difficult to imagine that personal data will be 
regulated as a thing separable from the person.76 Data subjects will likely have 
very limited mechanisms of control even if there are colorable arguments for 
personal data falling on the subject side of the dichotomy.77 Ultimately, Hegel’s 
criteria for separability fail to track firm normative commitments and likely 
defers to the whims of powerful actors.78 
2.  Separability as Physical Separation 
Separability as physical separation appeals to both philosophers and 
property theorists. Kant and Radin endorse resolving concerns over separability 
through an analysis of the physical connection between the person and thing.79 
However, mere physical separation fails to correctly identify the normative 
stakes inherent in separability. Often things that are physically intact do not 
appear to use the person. By contrast, things that are physically separate may 
retain nonphysical connections to the person and potentially use the person.80 
Thus, physical separation fails to track the dignity interests of the person, so 
separability must rest on a different conceptual foundation. 
 
 71. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 72. See infra Section III.A.2. 
 73. See infra Section III.A.3. 
 74. See infra Section III.B. 
 75. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 10, at 1895; Singer, supra note 67, at 472. 
 76. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1389–90 (discussing how the debate over “transaction costs” is 
inconsistent across intellectual property and privacy and, instead, reflects larger political motivations). 
 77. Just as Hegel sought to commodify labor to satisfy the dictates of the market, platform firms 
will invariably move to consider personal information something commodifiable in order to meet the 
needs of the platform economy. See id. (discussing the inherently political choices that make up the 
debates over information policy). 
 78. Again, the Legal Realists noted that underdetermination of legal rules leads to powerful actors 
(usually judges) making decisions that appear to inexorably follow from rules but instead reflect latent 
policy preferences. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1700 (1976); see also Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical 
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 496–502 (1987) (offering a detailed analysis of the indeterminacy 
critique provided by the Legal Realists). 
 79. KANT, LECTURES, supra note 21, at 124; see also Munzer, supra note 57, at 319; Radin, Property, 
supra note 21, at 966. 
 80. For example, a kidney can be physically separated and donated, but it retains a genetic link to 
the donor that persists after the physical connection is severed. 
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a. The Roots of Separability as Physical Separation 
Immanuel Kant offers an early account of separability as physical 
separation. More specifically, Kant reduces separability to the body concept. 
Things that are (or once were) connected to the body are inseparable and unfit 
for property claims. Moreover, anything not connected to the body is 
appropriate for property claims. It bears repeating that Kant’s view of 
separability is inherently normative: Kant argues that it undermines the dignity 
of the person to treat them merely as a thing that is used in service of another 
person’s ends. 
Though Kant is not always explicit about the reduction of separability to 
the body concept, it follows naturally from some of his conclusions about 
creating property rights in any part of the body. For example, Kant writes that 
a person is not permitted to sell any part of their body, “even if [they] were 
offered ten thousand thalers for a single finger.”81 Kant similarly suggests that 
a person cannot sell a single tooth.82 Based on these statements, Kant seems to 
consider all body parts inseparable, even if they are painlessly removed and bear 
little attachment to the self. 
While Radin is skeptical of bright-line distinctions between persons and 
things, she offers some claims about how to resolve this boundary.83 Like Kant, 
Radin reaches for physical connectedness to determine separability. To that 
end, Radin claims 
[w]e have an intuition that property necessarily refers to something in 
the outside world, separate from oneself. . . . [T]he idea of property 
seems to require some perceptible boundary, at least insofar as property 
requires the notion of thing, and the notion of thing requires separation 
from self. This intuition makes it seem appropriate to call parts of the 
body property only after they have been removed . . . .84 
Conversely, Radin suggests that if a person has prosthetic limbs implanted into 
their body, these implants become part of the person.85 Radin relies on physical 
separation to determine separability. Things that are currently in the body are 
inseparable (and not propertizable), while things that are outside of the body 
are separable (and propertizable). 
 
 81. KANT, LECTURES, supra note 21, at 124; see also Munzer, supra note 57, at 319. 
 82. KANT, LECTURES, supra note 21, at 165; see also Ruth F. Chadwick, The Market for Bodily Parts: 
Kant and Duties to Oneself, 6 J. APPLIED PHIL. 129, 133 (1989) (citing this passage from Kant at greater 
length). 
 83. Radin, Property, supra note 21, at 966 (“Though the general idea of property for personhood 
means that the boundary between person and thing cannot be a bright line . . . .”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 966–67. 
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However, Radin’s account is less restrictive than Kant’s because it allows 
property claims in body parts that have been separated from the person.86 Kant, 
by contrast, considers all parts that begin connected to the person as unsuited 
for property claims, even after they are separated from the person.87 Yet both 
views fail to track the background normative commitments of separability across 
an array of cases. 
b. The Limits of Separability as Physical Separation 
While reducing separability to physical separation has intuitive appeal and 
is easily administrable, it fails to correctly identify when a dignity violation 
occurs through use of something that is potentially inseparable. Physical 
separation is both overinclusive and underinclusive. That is, some things that 
are physically connected to the person may have little attachment to the self 
and do not necessarily implicate a person’s dignity interests, leading to 
overinclusion. Conversely, some things that are physically separate may retain 
a nonphysical connection that can plausibly be leveraged to use the person, 
leading to underinclusion. At bottom, physical separation fails to adequately 
resolve ambiguities around when a person’s interest—by virtue of their 
connection to the thing—is exhausted. 
i.  Overinclusion 
Both Kant’s and Radin’s approaches to separability as physical separation 
risk overinclusion. That is, transferring control over some parts of the body does 
not necessarily undermine the dignity of the person. Stephen Munzer argues 
that restrictions on selling or transferring inessential body parts (such as hair) 
founder because they mistakenly assume that how a person treats parts of the 
body is indicative of how the person is treated.88 According to Munzer, even if 
we grant the assumption that a person cannot have property rights in the whole 
person, this does not necessarily mean that they lack property interests in parts 
of their bodies.89 Moreover, Munzer claims that this logical move is unjustified 
because it depends on the fallacy of division, which wrongly claims that what is 
true of individual parts is true of the whole.90 
Returning to the normative values that separability serves, just because 
part of the body is physically connected, this connection does not necessarily 
mean that transferring control over that part transfers control over the person. 
Put another way, using a person’s hair as a means to an end does not use the 
 
 86. Id. at 966 (discussing the possibility for blood or organs that have been removed from the 
body to be considered incidents of property). 
 87. KANT, LECTURES, supra note 21, at 166. 
 88. Munzer, supra note 57, at 325. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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person (who grew the hair) as a means to an end. Thus, physical separation does 
not fully determine the dignity interests inherent in separability. 
ii.  Underinclusion 
Separability as physical separation may also be underinclusive because it 
reduces the person to their physical boundaries. Put differently, things that may 
be physically separate from the person may still retain a nonphysical connection 
to the person that implicates important dignity values. Moreover, the 
boundaries of the person may plausibly extend beyond things that are physically 
connected to them. While demarcating the person in terms of physical 
boundaries is easily administrable, it falters because things that are not physically 
connected may still be robustly connected to the person. 
Philosophical writing on personal identity casts doubt on strict 
demarcations of the person according to their physical boundaries. 91  More 
specifically, the conceptual criteria that are required for the same person to exist 
through space and time are often not merely physical continuity. 92  Some 
philosophers, including John Locke, consider psychological continuity—rather 
than physical continuity—the cornerstone for defining the person.93 Put more 
simply, if person A’s memories are transferred into person B’s body, then the 
person who inhabits B’s body is A, not B.94 The focus on nonphysical criteria 
for the persistence of personal identity reinforces the idea that the person is not 
exclusively reducible to their physical boundaries. 
Moreover, some things that are foundational to our person and sense of 
identity are not things that are physically connected to us.95 It is plausible that 
a wedding band that is passed down across generations is more constitutive of 
our person than a lock of hair. Similarly, control over these nonphysically 
connected things is potentially more significant to our identities than things 
that happen to retain a physical connection to our person.96 
 
 91. Eric T. Olson, Personal Identity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/identity-personal/#UndPerQue [https://perma.cc/52M7-SCBC] (Sept. 10, 2019) (discussing 
psychological continuity views of personal identity). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (claiming that psychological views of identity persistence hold that “[i]f your brain were 
transplanted, and that organ carried with it your memories and other mental features, the resulting 
person would be convinced that he or she was you”). We can imagine that memories are transplanted 
even without transferring any biological material, thus strengthening the focus on psychological, rather 
than physical, continuity. 
 95. Interestingly, this intuition appears to underlie Radin’s work on property and personhood. 
See generally Radin, Property, supra note 21, at 959 (claiming that certain things “are closely bound up 
with personhood because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal 
entities”). 
 96. Id. (discussing how some things, like wedding bands, can become bound up with our personal 
identities). 
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Consider three of the cases that this Article discusses—creative works, 
personal image, and personal data. Creative works are commonly referred to as 
extensions of the person, though, of course, created works are not physically 
connected to the person.97 Take our personal image. Often people control their 
image through manipulating their physical appearance, yet a person’s image is 
also constituted by photographs of them or even physical items (clothes and 
accessories) that functionally comprise identity. Thus, identity is constituted by 
both things that are physically connected to the person as well as things that are 
physically distinct. Finally, personal data is not physically connected to the 
person but retains a semantic connection because it is about them. Thus, 
nonphysical connection can implicate the same fundamental dignity values as 
many things that are physically connected to the person. 
3.  Separability as Contingency 
J.E. Penner reaches beyond mere physical separation to craft a more 
capacious account of separability.98 According to Penner, separability implies 
contingency; that is, something that is separable can only be contingently 
connected to any particular person.99 The converse of this statement provides 
more clarity; that is, property does not have any necessary connection to a 
particular person. 100  For example, our personality and our talents are not 
separable because they are necessarily connected to us—these things make us 
who we are.101 Likewise, friendships are not separable because the substance of 
friendship is based on the people involved.102 In these cases, there are necessary 
links to specific people, making these things inseparable and unfit for property 
claims.103 
Penner’s conceptual framework for demarcating separability is that new 
owners must stand in basically the same relationship to the thing as past and 
 
 97. Hughes, Philosophy, supra note 31, at 337 (noting that “intellectual property need not be 
justified by analogy to physical property”). 
 98. Penner’s separation thesis states: 
Only those ‘things’ in the world which are contingently associated with any particular owner 
may be objects of property; as a function of the nature of this contingency, in theory nothing 
of normative consequence beyond the fact that the ownership has changed occurs when an 
object of property is alienated to another. 
PENNER, supra note 21, at 111. Further, Wyman claims that Penner’s account of separability composes 
one of the most complete accounts of distinguishing persons from things within property theory. 
Wyman, supra note 12, at 197. 
 99. PENNER, supra note 21, at 111. 
 100. Id. at 112. 
 101. Id. at 111–12. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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future owners.104 In other words, there is nothing normatively significant about 
the relationship between any particular owner and the thing.105 In order to more 
adequately capture this point, Penner claims that contingency requires that the 
thing “might just as well be someone else’s.”106 
Separability as contingency recognizes the role of social and technological 
considerations. 107  Consider, again, the separability of body parts. Penner 
suggests that body parts are a highly useful case for probing the contextual 
considerations of separability because “the extent to which we regard our body 
parts as separable from us is a matter of intention, social convention, and 
technology . . . .”108 
Separability is partly a product of cultural or social convention. In some 
cultures, specific parts of the body may be more intimately connected to the 
person, while other cultures may view these parts as nonessential and seemingly 
disconnected. For example, some societies have viewed hair as deeply 
intertwined with the person and cutting or altering a particular hairstyle leads 
to dignity loss and personal harm.109 For instance, a Japanese Samurai warrior’s 
“top knot” hairstyle reflected social standing and, further, removing a warrior’s 
top knot often resulted in harm to dignity as well as a decline in social status.110 
Most cultures do not view hairstyle as necessarily entwined with the dignity 
interests and social standing of an individual, thus making hair potentially 
separable from the person and transferrable without restrictions. 
Additionally, the ability to separate body parts depends on technology, 
such as the current state of surgical methods. Some organs might be removable 
using today’s advanced medical practices but not necessarily so in earlier 
historical moments. A kidney, then, may be inessential to the person and 
separable using contemporary medical practices, yet kidneys at earlier historical 
moments were essential parts of the person because there was no extant method 
of physically removing them. As a result, whether a thing might as well be 
someone else’s depends on a host of factors, including both social and 
technological ones. 
 
 104. Id. at 112. 
 105. Id. at 111. 
 106. Id. at 112. Without this addition Penner fears that property would sweep too broadly and 
include both tort damages and contract obligations as potential property, as there is nothing necessary 
about our relationship to them. For many essentialist property scholars like Penner, part of the project 
of property theory is distinguishing it from other privacy law concepts, such as contract and tort. At 
bottom, contractual obligations and tort damages bind only specific people (in personam), while 
property obligates the world generally (in rem). 
 107. Id. at 121; see also Wyman, supra note 12, at 208 (claiming that determinations of separability 
in new essentialism are not static). 
 108. PENNER, supra note 21, at 121. 
 109. See Suzanne G. O’Brien, Splitting Hairs: History and the Politics of Daily Life in Nineteenth-
Century Japan, 67 J. ASIAN STUD. 1309, 1328–29 (2008). 
 110. See id. at 1318–19. 
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Penner’s theory of separability marks an improvement over earlier 
accounts because it recognizes the contextual conditions that underlie 
separability. Moreover, Penner’s account of how a thing is connected to a 
person implicitly understands that connections are not exclusively physical. The 
condition that the thing might as well be someone else’s captures the various 
ways in which a person can be connected to a thing. 
While Penner’s account of separability captures important aspects of the 
connection between a person and a thing, it overlooks another vital feature of 
separability. Penner fails to recognize cases where the object “might just as well 
be someone else’s” even as there are specific uses that are tied to a different 
person.111 Separability as contingency overlooks the fact that the relationship 
that exists between a person and a thing is often a product of how the thing is 
used, rather than some ontological feature of the thing. 
For example, many different people could potentially stand in the same 
relationship to a kidney. Kidneys are often donated and become someone else’s, 
yet the kidney still contains a genetic link to the donor.112 While the kidney 
itself is disconnected from the donor, some uses are still connected to that 
person by virtue of it having been their kidney in the past. For instance, 
different uses of the genetic material found in the kidney can affect the donor, 
and they have some interest in controlling these uses. As a result, the 
deontological interests that undergird separability turn on the specifics of how 
the kidney is used. 
Personal data faces a similar stumbling block. Personal data is physically 
separable from the person and, in most cases, there is nothing normatively 
significant about who controls personal data. Still, some uses are connected to 
a particular person while others are not.113 At bottom, Penner fails to recognize 
that the normative values that separability tracks often turn principally on use, 
rather than connection alone. 
In order to account for some of these complications, the next part provides 
a novel vision of separability that recognizes the importance of use. 
 
 111. PENNER, supra note 21, at 112. 
 112. Malgorzata Zagozda, Agnieszka Sarnecka & Marek Durlik, Microchimerism After Pancreas and 
Kidney Transplantation – A Review, 16 ANNALS OF TRANSPLANTATION 134, 134 (2011) (“The donor’s 
genetic material (DNA) is detected in the recipient’s blood and lymphoid tissues even a few months 
after transplant rejection.”). 
 113. Personal data can be used in several distinct ways and only some of them are connected to the 
data subject. For example, personal data may be used for a research study, but the use is more distinct 
as long as the personal data is not used to make decisions about the data subject or to otherwise affect 
them. Of course, an analysis of when a use affects an individual is highly contingent and subject to a 
host of social considerations. 
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II.  A USE THEORY OF SEPARABILITY 
This part offers a new vision of separability that more fully recognizes the 
importance of use for this analysis—separability as a function of how a thing is 
used rather than some inherent feature of the thing. By contrast, previous 
theories of separability focus almost exclusively on the connection that a person 
has to a thing.114 The exclusive focus on connection is undesirable conceptually 
and normatively. Conceptually, an analysis of separability that focuses 
principally on connection falters because—as demonstrated in the cases 
included in this part—a person’s ongoing link to a thing is determined primarily 
by how it is used, rather than the connection alone. 
Normatively, these conceptual errors frustrate the stakes of separability 
because an account of separability that commits these errors fails to track a 
person’s interests in uses of a thing that is connected to them. A more complete 
account of separability tracks the dignity interests of the person across a two-
step process. First, some things retain a connection to the person even after 
they are physically transferred. For instance, creative works—as well as the 
other boundary cases discussed—are still associated with the artist even after 
they are sold. When downstream uses appropriate that connection, these uses 
effectively use that person. Second, when a person is used through uses of a 
thing that is connected to them, it risks treating that person as merely a means 
to an end, undermining their inherent dignity. 
Additionally, a person may contest certain uses of things that appropriate 
the connection to the person by appealing to the same underlying logic that 
allows a person to control access to their body. Both of these concerns—the 
right not to be used as merely a means and the right to control our person—are 
commonplace deontological values worthy of protection through law. A 
renewed vision of separability that accommodates the significance of different 
uses resolves previous conceptual missteps and more closely aligns to these core 
normative values. 
This part unfolds as follows. First, this part offers a simple thought 
experiment to help frame the importance of connection and use for separability. 
Next, this part provides an overview of the use theory of separability. Section 
II.B.1 focuses on the connection aspect of separability. This analysis highlights 
particularized connections that continue to connect a person to a thing, even after 
physical transfer. Section II.B.2 examines uses and how they interact with 
separability. Here, the paradigmatic case of inseparability becomes clear: a use 
is inseparable when it appropriates a particularized connection in a way that 
affects the person, creating a particularized effect. Section II.B.3 solves the puzzle 
introduced at the beginning of this part. Finally, Section II.B.4 examines 
 
 114. See supra Section I.B. 
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potential ambiguities inherent in this model and offers suggestions to minimize 
their consequences. 
A. The Puzzle of Separability 
In order to understand the importance of use for an analysis of 
separability, consider the following examples. Imagine that Amy donates a 
kidney to Brad. The kidney has a connection to Amy even after it is transferred 
to Brad because Amy’s genetic information is stored in the kidney after it is 
implanted into Brad’s body. The connection that Amy retains to the kidney is 
constant, but consider how four different uses potentially implicate Amy’s 
interests. 
First, imagine that after the kidney donation procedure Brad develops a 
few unhealthy habits. He regularly stays out late in bars where he smokes 
cigarettes and drinks himself into a stupor. A mutual friend tells Amy about 
Brad’s lifestyle choices. Amy is frustrated by this news. In particular, she claims 
that Brad is misusing his new kidney because of his drinking and smoking. She 
claims that she should be able to control what Brad consumes because the kidney 
was hers. 
Second, imagine that after the kidney donation procedure Brad develops 
a budding interest in biomedical research. Moreover, he is particularly 
interested in how kidney cells respond to different external conditions, such as 
temperature and light. To fulfill this interest, Brad takes cells from his original 
kidney and his newly implanted one. He examines how his kidney cells and 
Amy’s cells respond to changed conditions. A mutual friend informs Amy that 
Brad is conducting experiments on cells that contain her genetic information. 
Amy is upset by this news and wants to stop Brad from conducting research on 
“her” cells. 
Third, imagine that after the kidney donation procedure Brad invites Amy 
over to thank her for saving his life. Amy and Brad share in common their 
mutual interest in practical jokes. Thinking it will be funny, Brad splices some 
of Amy’s cells into a petri dish and spills the cells on the tile floor outside of his 
apartment. He figures that Amy will come over and slip on the cells and they 
both will get a good laugh out of it. What type of interest does Amy have in 
preventing Brad from using her cells to create a hazard intended for her? 
Fourth, imagine that after the kidney donation procedure Brad enters the 
employment of a health insurance company that provides coverage for Amy. In 
his new job, Brad is responsible for determining insurance premiums. One day 
Amy’s file comes across his desk. Brad figures that he can make a more accurate 
assessment of Amy’s rates if he tests her residual kidney cells for genetic 
anomalies. Amy learns that Brad is analyzing the cells to adjust her insurance 
rates and wants to stop Brad from conducting this analysis. 
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While the connection that Amy retains to her kidney is constant through 
the examples, different uses of the kidney have different normative stakes. 
Moreover, Amy’s interests are differently implicated across the examples, which 
also informs how to craft legal responses to the different uses. The next section 
resolves the puzzle posed by these cases by developing a concept of inseparable 
uses that implicate Amy’s interest in controlling uses of things that are 
connected to her. 
B. (In)Separable Uses 
This section offers a new understanding of separability that focuses on 
both connection and use and, by extension, more faithfully tracks the normative 
values underlying separability. This marks an improvement over previous 
theories of separability. Earlier accounts of separability—such as those offered 
by Kant and Radin—overlook the significance of nonphysical connections.115 
This oversight inappropriately limits the interests in controlling things that are 
imbricated with our person to only the set of things that are physically 
connected. 
J.E. Penner offers a much-improved account of separability. Penner’s 
notion that separability is principally about whether a person is only 
contingently connected to the thing and, in particular, whether the thing “might 
just as well be someone else’s” implicitly recognizes the variety of physical and 
nonphysical connections that link people to things.116 However, Penner fails to 
understand that the normative bite of separability applies to how things are 
used, rather than the pure existence of a connection. For example, things that 
have necessary connections to a person may be used in ways that are 
normatively benign. On the other hand, some uses of things with necessary 
connections risk running afoul of deontological values such as the ability to 
control our person and be treated as an end rather than a means. 
Building on these insights, this section details a new account of 
separability that more faithfully tracks the normative stakes underlying 
separability. Inseparable uses depend on two factors. First, that the thing 
maintains a particularized connection to the person. And second, that the use 
leverages that connection and affects that person. People retain deontological 
interests over inseparable uses even after the thing is transferred, and legal 
regulation would benefit from considering these interests in crafting use 
restrictions. 
 
 115. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 116. PENNER, supra note 21, at 112. 
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1.  Connection 
While the theory of separability offered here criticizes past efforts for their 
narrow focus on the connection between a person and a thing, connection is still 
an indispensable part of this separability analysis. In particular, the existence of 
a particularized connection between a person and a thing is a necessary condition 
for inseparable uses. The defining feature of a particularized connection is that 
the link between the person and the thing survives alienation or transfer—even 
when the thing is transferred it is still connected to the person. As a result, a 
thing with a particularized connection may be transferred, but the interests that 
a person has in the uses of the thing cannot be alienated. 
Other bodies of law recognize the normative significance of particularized 
connections. For example, Hegelian theories of intellectual property—often 
referred to as personality theory—provide a strong normative foundation for 
examining connections that exist between a person and a thing even after 
transfer.117 Personality theory generally asserts that an author is so intimately 
connected with their work that they should be given specific rights to control 
their work.118 Further, personality theories of copyright consider works to be 
extensions of an author’s person, such that intrusions on the work are akin to 
invasions of the author’s body.119 
Alongside a Hegelian personality connection, people may have a 
particularized connection to a thing by virtue of an attributional relationship 
that continues after transfer. An attributional relationship exists when people 
make judgments about a person based on their having created something.120 An 
attributional relationship is common with works of art. For instance, Pablo 
Picasso has an attributional connection to his painting Guernica.121 When people 
view the painting, they attribute the work to Picasso and make judgments about 
his artistic skill. 
 
 117. See Hughes, Philosophy, supra note 31, at 337–39 (discussing Hegelian justifications for 
intellectual property). 
 118. Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Copyright and Personhood, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1041 
(explaining that under personhood theory, “authors have such deep connections with their creations 
that respect for their sense of self requires giving them a degree of ongoing control over those works”). 
 119. Id.; see also Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors 
and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940) (“When an artist creates, . . . he does more than bring 
into the world a unique object having only exploitative possibilities; he projects into the world part of 
his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use.”). 
 120. See David Ekserdjian & Doug Fishbone, Debate: Should We Care About Attribution?, ROYAL 
ACAD. MAG. (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.royalacademy.org.uk/article/giorgione-debate-does-
attribution-matter [https://perma.cc/6W4N-KDZL]; see also Martin Bailey, Not a Fake: Van Gogh Self-
Portrait Is His Only Work Painted While Suffering Psychosis, Experts Say, ART NEWSPAPER (Jan. 
20, 2020 1:04 PM), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/a-van-gogh-self-portrait-authenticated 
[https://perma.cc/5625-SEP3] (explaining that authenticating attribution of a work to Van Gogh 
enables the work to “provide[] a unique insight into his mental condition”). 
 121. Alicja Zelazko, Guernica: Work by Picasso, BRITANNICA (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Guernica-by-Picasso [https://perma.cc/ZV2W-PEU7]. 
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The semantic connection between a person and information about them is 
particularized because it is not exhausted when a new person controls the 
information. The crux of the semantic connection inherent in personal data is 
that the information is about a specific person.122 Further, the link between the 
data and the specific person survives the transfer of the data itself.123 
People often have biological connections to things, as is the case with any 
person who transfers anything containing their genetic information. 124 
Donations of biological material include the genetic information of the donor.125 
Like the other kinds of particularized connections, the genetic link between a 
person and their biological material remains intact once the material is 
physically separated from the person.126 Kidneys, blood, and reproductive tissue 
all contain the genetic information of the donor even after they are removed 
and after they have been implanted into a new person.127 
However, as the next section details, only some uses depend on a 
particularized connection linking a person to a thing. Normatively, a person has 
an interest in controlling those uses because they implicate the dignitary 
interests of that person. Thus, a thick, normative conception of separability 
necessarily turns on an analysis of both connection and use. 
2.  Connection and Use 
An analysis of separability that focuses on both connection and use more 
faithfully tracks foundational normative considerations and allows us to parse 
cases based on these commitments. Broadly, when a person is connected to a 
thing that is transferred, their interests are implicated by particular uses rather 
than the mere fact of transfer. In particular, only some uses are inseparable from 
the person. Inseparable uses attach to important normative values, such as the 
capacity to control things that are necessarily connected to the person and have 
corresponding implications for deontological moral philosophy. 
For separability to track these normative considerations, both connection 
and use are important points of analysis. The initial threshold condition of 
separability is whether the thing has a particularized connection to a person. 
Uses of separable things may affect a particular person, but the effect is not a 
product of their connection to the thing. For instance, a hair sample that 
 
 122. GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4(1) (defining personal data as information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person). As we can see, even the GDPR’s definitional foundation of “personal 
data” is that it is connected to a person. 
 123. Id. art. 4(20) (referring to “transfers or a set of transfers of personal data”). 
 124. For the kidney transplant discussion, see supra Section I.B.3. 
 125. Zagozda et al., supra note 112, at 134 (“The donor’s genetic material (DNA) is detected in the 
recipient’s blood and lymphoid tissues even a few months after transplant rejection.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. In addition, the donor’s genetic material may even be detectable in cases where the transplant 
is rejected. Id. 
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contains a person’s genetic information may be destroyed or used in a piece of 
conceptual art without necessarily affecting that person. This is because even 
when a thing has a particularized connection, some uses are separable because 
they do not depend on the connection linking the person to the thing. 
Starting with the conceptual structure of inseparability, the defining 
characteristic of an inseparable use is that it leads to particularized effects, which 
are effects that are particular to you because the thing is (or was) your thing or 
connected to you in some way. In other words, the use of the thing affects you 
because you have some relationship to it. Thus, it is not simply about an object 
having a particularized connection or about the use of the object affecting a 
particular person; rather, some uses depend on the connection to create these 
effects—these uses are inseparable.128 
Inseparable uses leverage a particularized connection to bring about an 
effect on a person (again, a particularized effect). This special class of uses is 
exclusively the result of the connection a person has to a specific thing and, 
further, how some uses exploit that connection, leading to effects on that 
person. Again, recognizing a person’s interest in controlling uses that lead to 
particularized effects is an inherently normative project. The central point is 
that these uses are intimately tied to the person and, as a result, the person 
should have some claim to control or prohibit these uses even if the thing is 
transferred. This marks an improvement over previous theories because it 
recognizes that a person’s dignity interests are implicated by use, rather than 
simply the existence of a connection. 
Based on this view of separability, we can examine the initial puzzle that 
this part introduced. In doing so, use-based separability analyzes the different 
uses of Amy’s donated kidney in light of foundational normative commitments. 
3.  Solving the Puzzle of Separability 
This part began with a puzzle. Amy donated a kidney to Brad. 
Subsequently, Brad used the kidney in a variety of ways. Examining Brad’s 
different uses through separability reveals how Amy’s interests are implicated 
differently across the cases and how different uses of the kidney conflict with 
deontological commitments that use-based separability successfully tracks. 
 
 128. Philosophers working on the conceptual boundaries of Kant’s prohibition against using a 
person merely as a means recognize that violating the principle requires that the person (or parts of the 
person) used must be necessary to accomplish the use’s ends. See Guerrero, supra note 24, at 789. The 
existence of a particularized effect tracks the same central idea that the effects on the person must be a 
product of the fact that use appropriates a thing that is connected to them. The notion of particularized 
effect and Guerrero’s condition for using merely as a means both track the idea that the person (or 
thing connected to the person) must be essential for the use. 
 
 
99 N.C. L REV. 427 (2021) 
454 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
Consider, again, the first case of the puzzle. After receiving the kidney 
from Amy, Brad begins smoking and drinking regularly. This lifestyle choice 
creates additional strain on his recently implanted kidney. Should Amy have a 
legal interest in controlling Brad’s lifestyle based on the effects that it has on 
the kidney’s functioning? Probably not. 
Amy should not have a legally recognizable interest in controlling Brad’s 
consumption choices for several reasons. To start, Brad’s use of the kidney does 
not rely on the connection that it has to Amy. Similarly, this logic would be the 
same if Amy had sold Brad her car, and Brad decided to drive the car recklessly. 
While Amy may dislike Brad’s driving habits, she should not be able to exercise 
control over them. Similarly, Amy should not be able to exercise control over 
Brad’s consumption choices. All of the effects of Brad’s actions are borne 
specifically by Brad (or the public generally) rather than Amy. More 
importantly though, Brad is using the kidney to filter blood, which does not 
depend on the fact that the kidney retains a connection to Amy. He is using the 
kidney as a thing disconnected from Amy, rather than using the connection it 
has to Amy. 
In the second case, Brad uses Amy’s kidney cells to conduct several 
experiments. Brad splices the cells with Amy’s genetic information and exposes 
them to different levels of temperature and light to study how the cells respond. 
Should Amy have the legal ability to prevent Brad from using these cells for 
research? Again, probably not. While Brad happens to use cells that have a 
genetic connection to Amy, the use does not depend on the fact that they retain 
a connection to Amy. If Brad had received a donated kidney from Claire, he 
would still be able to conduct roughly the same experiments (using Claire’s 
kidney cells rather than Amy’s) in service of his recent fascination with biology. 
The situation is trickier in the practical joke case. Here, Brad uses a thing 
with a particularized connection to Amy in order to affect her. Brad places 
Amy’s cells outside of his apartment door, thinking that she will slip on them 
when she comes over to his apartment. While Amy has an obvious interest in 
not being the target of practical jokes that lead to physical harm, this interest is 
not a product of the connection she has to her kidney cells. This is because 
Brad’s use of the cells does not rely on the connection that they have to Amy. 
In other words, Brad’s use of the cells depends on their slippery quality, 
rather than the fact that they have a connection to Amy. Brad could have used 
his own cells to achieve similar results, or any other slippery liquid. As a result, 
Amy’s interest in contesting this use is not a product of the connection that she 
has to her cells, but rather the general interests she has in not being the subject 
of physical harm. Stated again, the fact that Brad used Amy’s cells does not 
provide a reasonable normative foundation to contest this use. 
Finally, Brad’s use of Amy’s genetic information to adjust her insurance 
premiums is an inseparable use. Amy has an interest in controlling this use 
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because of her particularized connection to her kidney cells. Inseparable uses 
form a circuit between the connection that a person has to the thing and the 
effects of the use. In these cases, the effect depends on the connection that a 
person has to the thing. 
Put differently, when Brad uses the kidney cells to adjust Amy’s insurance 
rates, the effect of this action is dependent on the connection that Amy has to 
the cells. Unlike in the hazard example, the use depends on the fact that the 
cells are connected to Amy. If Brad had used someone else’s cells (or his own), 
the effect would not be the same on Amy. As a result, Amy has a strong 
normative foundation to contest these uses. Again, this foundation is based on 
the deontological interests that Amy has in controlling things that are connected 
to her and, further, how some uses of these things treat Amy as a means to an 
end. 
4.  Potential Conceptual Ambiguity for Separability 
There are a few principal sources of ambiguity in a model of inseparability 
that is premised on connection and use. The connection element of 
inseparability is subject to two distinct challenges of ambiguity. First, potential 
limitations on use are less clear when the person who maintains a particularized 
connection to the thing is deceased. Second, conceptual ambiguity also 
potentially arises when multiple people maintain particularized connections to 
the same thing. However, both of these challenges are ultimately resolvable. 
Alongside the ambiguities around connection, effects are sometimes unable to 
be resolved by logic alone. That is, sometimes the interests that a person has in 
controlling an inseparable use is outweighed by countervailing concerns. 
a. Separability After Death 
Death poses an interesting puzzle for separability. At first glance, death 
appears to sever the connection between a person and a thing, thus undermining 
justifications for use restrictions based on inseparability. However, some 
inseparable interests survive the death of the person who was originally 
connected to the thing. Often, other people are connected to the deceased 
person and, in virtue of this connection, have an interest in how the thing is 
used. While death may sever the connection with the original person, some 
people may still have inseparable interests based on their connection to the 
deceased. 
National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish 129  demonstrates 
these conceptual issues quite well. The issue in Favish centered on whether the 
National Park Service was justified in denying, on privacy grounds, a Freedom 
of Information Act (“FOIA”) request for death scene photographs of recently 
 
 129. 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
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deceased Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster. 130  While none of 
Foster’s family members were depicted in the photographs, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the uses of information about Foster also implicated the 
interests of his family.131 
In doing so, the Supreme Court derived use restrictions based on the 
privacy interests of Foster’s family rather than dignity interests that Foster 
retains after death.132 Use-based separability loosely follows this tradition. That 
is, upon the death of a person with a connection to a thing, uses may become 
separable. However, this is culturally dependent. If a different socio-legal 
system recognizes some continuing connection that persists after death, then 
the legal system could reasonably build use restrictions around these 
connections. 
The central upshot of Favish is that, even though the photographs were 
not about Foster’s family, his family still had some recognizable interest in their 
use based on their connection to Foster. 133 However, determinations about 
when interpersonal relationships are sufficient to generate interests may involve 
difficult line-drawing problems. For instance, should Foster’s extended family 
be able to control the uses of photos depicting him? Even more remotely, should 
former friends be able to exercise these same levers of control? Importantly, a 
renewed focus on use allows us to sidestep some of the inherent fuzziness of 
these determinations. Previous models of separability focused entirely on 
connection, so ambiguity about connection caused these theories to falter.134 
Instead, use-based separability also examines how potential uses change this 
calculus, thus clearing up some of the inherent fuzziness. 
Inevitably, however, some line drawing will remain. That said, legislation 
organized around a vision of separability based on use allows courts (or 
legislatures) to assess and balance the interests at stake in different uses. Often, 
though, these tradeoffs will sound in conflicts over individual versus social 
interests, yet both legislatures and courts routinely resolve these tensions and 
will be able to do so similarly in these instances.135 
 
 130. Id. at 160 (“This case requires us to interpret the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). FOIA 
does not apply if the requested data fall within one or more exemptions. Exemption 7(C) excuses from 
disclosure ‘records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes’ if their production ‘could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’” (citation omitted) 
(quoting the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7)))). 
 131. Id. at 165–66. 
 132. Id. at 166. 
 133. Id. at 166–67. 
 134. See supra Section I.B. 
 135. See Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical Perspective, 22 YALE 
J.L. & HUMANS. 171, 199–200 (2010) (describing how the public disclosure tort protects private 
interests but is subject to a “newsworthy” defense that allows publication of private facts that are issues 
of legitimate public concern). 
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b. Multiple Connections 
Situations where multiple people are connected to a single thing also 
create potential complications for an analysis of separability. When people 
cooperate to create a work of art, that single artistic creation is connected to all 
of the coauthors. Similarly, information may contain a link to a group of people. 
In particular, data can describe individuals, but often it describes groups of 
people such as families or neighborhoods. 
The problem of multiple connections has proven a difficult issue for both 
intellectual property and information law. 136  More specifically, courts and 
commentators have struggled to delineate what control rights individuals have 
based solely on their connection to the thing.137 In the next part, this issue will 
be discussed more fully in the context of information law; however, expanding 
the analysis to include an examination of use provides a principle to resolve 
some of these difficulties. More specifically, even when a thing is connected to 
multiple people, the use may affect particular people. In these cases, then, the 
people affected by the use have a stronger moral foundation to contest the use. 
c. Inseparable Uses Without Legal Recognition 
One final complication contemplates how the interests that inseparability 
tracks will be incorporated into the broader legal system. Here, moral 
philosophy runs into problems of legal implementation. Just because a person 
has an interest in controlling an inseparable use does not necessarily mean that 
the legal system should provide legally significant mechanisms of control. This 
problem is ultimately an issue of commensurability. Inevitably, there will be 
other interests (often public interests) that stand in opposition to the purely 
 
 136. See Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law, 51 CONN. L. REV. 58–59 
(2019) (describing concerns about the fragmented copyright control that would result from vesting 
actors with protectible interests in a finished motion picture). As Hughes notes, the originality 
requirement in copyright prevents fracturing control over a finished motion picture. Id. The concern 
is that mutual overlapping claims may prevent the dissemination of the work or distort the financial 
incentives that copyright purports to produce. However, this potential problem is largely mitigated by 
contractual agreements. Id. at 68. In addition, commentators often reject the possibility of ownership 
claims over personal data because it is unclear who would have the best claim to control. Cameron 
F. Kerry & John B. Morris, Jr., Why Data Ownership Is the Wrong Approach to Protecting 
Privacy, BROOKINGS (June 26, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/06/26/why-
data-ownership-is-the-wrong-approach-to-protecting-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/LC57-GZX6] 
(recognizing the potential for “intersecting interests” in ownership rights over personal data). 
 137. This is particularly problematic for information law where different actors purport to have 
the strongest claim over information. In Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), Justice 
Gorsuch squarely addressed the question of who had a better claim to the cell site location information 
(“CSLI”) that the government used to convict Carpenter. Id. at 2261–62 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
Turning toward a property model in his dissent, Justice Gorsuch claimed that Carpenter had a strong 
case for a protectible property interest in this information. Id. at 2272. The theoretical crux of this 
problem is that assigning rights over information is contested with many different actors having 
colorable claims to “ownership.” 
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private interests that separability identifies. In many cases, these purely private 
interests should give way to public concerns. 
However, this problem of commensurability is not unique to 
inseparability. First, the legal system commonly grapples with questions of 
private versus public interest. 138  Judicial decisions balance interests, and 
regulation is often premised on balancing different concerns.139 Second, this 
type of balancing is particularly common with information privacy law.140 Here, 
private individuals wish to keep information about themselves out of public 
scrutiny. 141 The public, by contrast, often wishes to access the information, 
especially when it implicates issues of public concern.142 Information privacy as 
a body of law has recognized these inherent tensions and developed mechanisms 
to calibrate these different interests. 143  Inseparability merely offers 
policymakers a lens to better identify the interests at stake. 
* * * * * 
Ultimately, separability—through the prism of connection and use—
advances a normative principle. That is, inseparable uses risk treating the 
person as a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself. These uses risk 
undermining the inherent dignity of the person. The next part builds on this 
normative framework and argues that we should craft legal mechanisms of 
control that track the values inherent in separability. In doing so, this part 
 
 138. Property law is faced with dilemmas over whether a person can control their land in ways that 
conflict with larger social goals as well as issues over takings where private property is transferred to 
the public. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1600–01 (1988) (discussing 
takings in private property); Richard F. Babcock & Duane A. Feurer, Land as a Commodity “Affected 
with a Public Interest”, 52 WASH. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (1977); Raymond J. Penn, Public Interest in Private 
Property (Land), 37 LAND ECON. 99, 102 (1961) (discussing the interplay between public and private 
interest in land use controls); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 (1964) 
(distinguishing takings from police power regulations). 
 139. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 
344–45 (1993) (discussing the use of balancing different interests in constitutional matters); see also 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76–77 (1980) (discussing the private interest of the 
mall owner versus public commitments to freedom of speech). 
 140. Newsworthiness—a defense to public disclosure tort suits—essentially claims that the 
information serves important public interest values and thus outweighs private interests in maintaining 
secrecy. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1829 (2010) 
(“Courts dismiss public disclosure claims where information addresses a newsworthy matter, in other 
words, one of public concern.”). However, newsworthiness is not a sufficient defense to intrusion upon 
seclusion claims. See Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 231 
(2012). 
 141. Bambauer, supra note 140, at 265–66 (“The [public disclosure] tort is constructed with a 
number of safety valves to ease the inherent tension between the right to speech and the right to not 
have one’s story told.”). 
 142. Id. at 232–33. 
 143. Id. at 233–34. 
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applies the separability framework to contested debates over property and 
information law. 
III.  SEPARABILITY AS A NORMATIVE FOUNDATION 
This part appropriates separability as a normative foundation for legal 
regulation. In particular, this part argues that separability should serve as a 
normative guidepost for crafting use restrictions for contested cases within 
property and information law. Section III.A concentrates on contested cases 
within property law and details how a focus on separability provides valuable 
insight about into whether and how to craft legal regulations over specific uses. 
Section III.B turns its insights to controversial issues within information law 
and suggests that separability offers a promising avenue to understand the 
normative stakes underlying use restrictions for personal data. 
A. Property Law 
This section applies the theory of separability to three contested cases in 
property law. To begin, this section returns to the debate over body parts, 
including genetic material and reproductive material. In doing so, this 
discussion applies use-based separability to determine the boundaries of control 
that exist after body parts are transferred. 
Next, this section applies separability to the debate over moral rights and 
the limits of control over creative works. The normative upshot of this 
discussion is that it identifies how potential uses of creative works implicate the 
values that separability protects. Moral rights regimes would do well to focus 
on inseparability, largely because it strikes a compromise that protects the 
dignity interests of the author while providing the purchaser flexibility to use 
the work as they see fit. 
Finally, this section applies separability to people’s image and likeness. In 
particular, this discussion focuses on rights of publicity and deepfakes. 144 
Within rights of publicity, use-based separability provides insight into the 
debate over the alienability of publicity rights. Additionally, use-based 
separability provides normative support for limiting the use of people’s images 
for deepfakes. 
1.  Body Parts and Reproductive Material 
Separability provides guidelines about whether and how a person should 
be able to control uses of their biological material. This puzzle underscores one 
 
 144. A deepfake is “an image or recording that has been convincingly altered and manipulated to 
misrepresent someone as doing or saying something that was not actually done or said.” Deepfake, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deepfake [https://perma.cc/ 
63L2-5K9P]. 
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of the most studied cases in property theory: Moore v. Regents of the University 
of California.145 In Moore, the California Supreme Court grappled with questions 
over Moore’s economic and personal interests in his spleen after it was removed 
during surgery and, unbeknownst to him, used for a profitable medical 
innovation.146 In particular, Moore’s claim for conversion of his bodily material 
was premised on the idea that he “continued to own his cells following their 
removal from his body, at least for the purpose of directing their use, and that 
he never consented to their use in potentially lucrative medical research.”147 
And further, because he did not consent to these uses, he was entitled to a 
proprietary interest in the products created from his cells.148 
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court found that Moore’s conversion 
claim failed. 149  The majority offered an array of theories to bolster their 
conclusion. First, the imposition of conversion liability for medical research on 
human cells would likely chill socially beneficial innovation. 150 Second, and 
more relevant to our analysis, the majority held that Moore’s conversion action 
required that he had to have possessed an ownership interest in his excised cells 
and, further, that he did not have such an interest.151 
However, the discussion about whether and what type of interest Moore 
has in his excised cells is precisely the question use-based separability addresses. 
In particular, we can consider whether Moore should have an interest in limiting 
scientific research and the eventual commercial exploitation of his cells. That 
said, the purely commercial exploitation of Moore’s cells is separable under this 
theory. As a result, Moore should have limited legal ability to control these 
uses. 
The scientific use of Moore’s cells is separable because the use does not 
rely on the inherent connection between Moore and his cells. Of course, the 
separability of this practice does not override the lack of informed consent in 
Moore’s case. But if Moore had consented to the surgery with full knowledge 
that surgeons could potentially use his cells for commercial purposes, then his 
downstream rights should be limited. Additionally, this use does not create any 
effects that are particular to Moore based on his connection to his cells. If 
anything, the effects are merely economic rather than personal. 
This does not mean that Moore does not have any interest in the use of 
his cells. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk makes a similar claim.152 Mosk 
 
 145. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 146. Id. at 480. 
 147. Id. at 487. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 493. 
 150. Id. at 493–94. 
 151. Id. at 488–89. 
 152. Id. at 510–11 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
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stresses that even though Moore’s rights over his excised sample were limited 
by statute, that does not mean that he did not have any property interest in 
them.153 This point is largely correct under the use-based separability theory. 
However, unlike Justice Mosk’s claim, use-based separability is agnostic about 
whether this interest is a property interest. According to use-based separability, 
Moore does have an interest in the inseparable uses of his cells because they 
remain connected to him even after transfer. Some uses, such as analyzing his 
genetic structure to make insurance determinations about him, are inseparable. 
More specifically, this use relies on the connection that Moore has to his cells 
and creates particular effects (increased price or lost opportunities) based on 
that connection. For this reason, Moore should be able to control this particular 
use. 
The boundaries of the theory can be sharpened by examining another set 
of cases regarding the rights of individuals to control biological material after it 
is transferred. In Doe v. Ministry of Health, 154  the Israeli Supreme Court 
considered whether a sperm donor could restrict unwanted future uses of his 
sperm.155 Here, an anonymous sperm donor transferred sperm to a woman who 
used it to conceive a child.156 Later, the woman wanted to conceive a second 
genetically related child, but the sperm donor had undergone a religious 
conversion that conflicted with the use of his sperm.157 The Supreme Court of 
Israel was forced to decide whether the donor could change his mind and block 
this use.158 In the end, the Israeli Supreme Court sided with the sperm donor 
and allowed him to change his mind and block additional uses of his sperm 
sample.159 
Ministry of Health provides an interesting lens for assessing use-based 
separability. In particular, this case anticipates some of the concerns that a focus 
on inseparable uses captures. More specifically, the opinion focuses on the 
strength of the connection between the donor and the use.160 To that end, the 
donor only retains a genetic connection to the child conceived; there are not 
any attendant legal obligations that attach.161 However, the use inherently relies 
on the donor’s genetic information to create a child.162 Moreover, the effect that 
this has on the donor is a product of the fact that it was his sperm that was used 
 
 153. Id. at 508. 
 154. HCJ 4077/12 (2013) (Isr.), https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/ 
Doe%20v.%20Ministry%20of%20Health.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL9E-XQV4]. 
 155. Id. at 3–4. 
 156. Id. at 4. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1. 
 159. Id. at 26. 
 160. Id. at 23–26. 
 161. Id. at 24–26. 
 162. Id. at 22. 
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to conceive the child.163 This effect, then, is particular to him.164 It is an open 
question whether the particularized effect is one that should be legally 
recognized. However, the Supreme Court of Israel gave legal weight to these 
effects on the donor and allowed him to restrict uses of his sperm.165 
However, Ministry of Health stands in interesting comparison to another 
Israeli Supreme Court case, Nahmani v. Nahmani.166 In Nahmani, Daniel and 
Ruth Nahmani each contributed reproductive tissue that was used to create a 
fertilized ova that was stored for future use.167 However, the couple separated 
before the fertilized ova could be implanted into a surrogate. 168  After the 
separation, Ruth petitioned—against Daniel’s objections—to gain control of the 
fertilized ova to produce a child.169 Here, the fertilized ova contained a genetic 
link to both Daniel and Ruth. Moreover, unlike in Ministry of Health, Daniel 
would not merely be a genetic father to the child. Instead, Daniel would be both 
a legal and genetic parent. Despite the stronger link in this case, the Israeli 
Supreme Court granted Ruth the legal right to use the fertilized ova.170 Part of 
the reasoning was that Ruth had no opportunities to have a genetically related 
child other than the fertilized ova at issue.171 This case, though, does highlight 
something important for separability. That is, just because someone has an 
inseparable interest does not mean it is absolute. Other interests may outweigh 
the particularized effects of an inseparable use, such as in Nahmani, where the 
mother lacked any other opportunity to have a genetically related child.172 
2.  Creative Works 
In many jurisdictions, authors of creative works are provided a collection 
of legal rights called “moral rights.”173 Moral rights generally rest on the idea 
that an artist retains a connection to their work after that work is transferred 
and, by extension, an artist should be able to exercise continuing control over 
 
 163. Id. at 24–26. 
 164. Id. at 26. 
 165. Id. 
 166. CivA 5587/93 (1995) (Isr.), https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/ 
Nahmani%20v.%20Nahmani.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3K7-BBL3]; see Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-
Embryos and the Right To Change One’s Mind, 12 DUKE J. COMPAR. INT’L. L. 75, 77–80 (2002). 
 167. Shapo, supra note 166, at 78. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 79; see also Joel Greenberg, Israeli Court Gives Wife the Right to Her Embryos, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 13, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/13/world/israeli-court-gives-wife-the-right-to-
her-embryos.html [https://perma.cc/ZRS9-LLJ5 (dark archive)]. 
 171. CivA 5587/93 Nahmani, at 41. 
 172. Id. 
 173. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES xiii (2010); Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 
263, 264 (2009); Brian Angelo Lee, Making Sense of “Moral Rights” in Intellectual Property, 84 TEMP. L. 
REV. 71, 73 (2011). 
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the work.174 Though largely considered a European import, moral rights are 
codified in the United States at both the federal and state level.175 Federally, 
moral rights are codified in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”).176 
Further, many state law provisions provide legal mechanisms of control similar 
to those provided by VARA.177 
VARA and its state law analogues provide artists a suite of rights. Often 
viewed as the most distinctive legal right within most moral rights regimes, the 
right of integrity allows artists to prevent modifications or alterations of their 
work.178 As conceived by VARA, the right of integrity provides visual artists 
with the legal ability to prevent alterations of a work that would be prejudicial 
to an artist’s reputation.179 Alongside legal control over modifications, VARA 
also vests in creators of works of “recognized stature” the right to prevent the 
work’s destruction. 180  Interestingly for our purposes, the right of integrity 
conferred under VARA expires upon the death of the artist.181 
Separability provides an interesting vantage point from which to assess 
moral rights, in part because these statutes implicitly recognize the continuing 
connection that exists between an artist and their work. Moreover, some moral 
rights anticipate the concerns of use-based separability, while other moral rights 
are harder to justify on these grounds and lead to inconsistencies across the 
American moral rights regime more generally. 
Consider the right of integrity, particularly as it is implemented in VARA. 
Here, artists are expressly entitled to prevent modifications that would impugn 
 
 174. Lee, supra note 173, at 79. 
 175. Id. at 73–74. 
 176. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 106A). 
 177. Lee, supra note 173, at 79–80 (discussing the American statutory landscape of moral rights). 
 178. Id. at 73. 
 179. § 603(a), 104 Stat. at 5129. 
 180. Id. 
 181. However, some states depart from VARA by terminating the right of integrity fifty years 
after the artist’s death. These states include California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and 
Pennsylvania. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(g)(1) (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116t(d)(1) (2019); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(g) (Westlaw through Chapter 226 of the 2020 2d Ann. Sess.); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(E) (Westlaw through the end of the 2d. Reg. Sess. and 1st Special Sess. 
of the 54th Legis. (2020)); 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107(1) (Westlaw through 2020 
Reg. Sess. Act 95). Other states do not terminate the right of integrity. According to Brian Lee, these 
states have an “implicitly perpetual” grant of the right of integrity. See Lee, supra note 173, at 81–82. 
These states include Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 51:2153 (Westlaw through the 2020 1st Extraordinary Sess.); ME. STAT. tit. 27, § 303(2) (Westlaw 
through the 2019 2d Reg. Sess. of the 129th Leg.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.740(1) (Westlaw through 
the end of both the 31st and 32d Spec. Sesss. (2020)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4 (Westlaw through 
L.2020, c. 127 and J.R. No. 2); 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-3 (LEXIS through Chapter 79 of the 2020 
Sess.); see Lee, supra note 173, at 79–80 nn.22–32, 82 nn.47–48. 
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the artist’s reputation.182 Oddly enough, this limited use-based restriction tracks 
the concerns of the theory of separability developed in this Article. More 
specifically, VARA grants an artist the ability to control uses of the work that 
lead to reputational effects by appropriating the attributional connection 
between a creator and the work. 183  The reputational effects envisioned by 
VARA are exactly the type of effects that use-based separability considers. Put 
differently, the effects created through modifications are specific to the author 
because the author retains a connection to the work in virtue of having created 
it. However, there may be some cases where modifications do not trace back to 
affect the author. For example, in situations where the work of art is not 
displayed publicly the attributional connection is attenuated, leading to limited 
reputational effects. 
However, other aspects of VARA represent a more haphazard approach to 
incorporating separability. Consider VARA’s prohibition against destroying 
works that have achieved a significant stature.184 Viewed through the prism of 
use-based separability, we should not be particularly worried about destruction. 
This is because destruction—unlike modification—severs the connection 
between an artist and their work rather than exploiting the associational 
connection in a way that leads to particular effects on the artist’s reputation. 
While the right against destruction may stem from a different normative 
foundation, two other possible justifications for moral rights create internal 
inconsistencies when applied to VARA’s prohibition on destruction. First, 
limiting destruction may be justified by the social value of preserving significant 
works of art. Yet this value is difficult to square with VARA’s expiration upon 
the death of the artist. 185  If the right against destruction was truly about 
preservation, then this right should be more fiercely safeguarded—likely by the 
public rather than the author. 
Second, the prohibition on destruction may follow from stronger Hegelian 
conceptions of separability. On these accounts, an author injects their 
personality into the work and, by extension, destroying the work leads to 
personal harms against its creator.186 However, accepting this rationale would 
suggest that VARA should incorporate additional rights (as is the case in many 
European jurisdictions) and the rights that VARA provides would be 
inalienable.187 For example, rather than protecting against modifications that 
 
 182. § 603(a), 104 Stat. at 5129 (permitting an author of a visual work to “prevent any intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor 
or reputation”). 
 183. Id. § 603(a), 104 Stat. at 5128. 
 184. Id. § 603(a), 104 Stat. at 5129. 
 185. Id. (stating the moral rights conferred under VARA endure for the life of the author). 
 186. See Roeder, supra note 119, at 556; Yoo, supra note 118, at 1048, 1076. 
 187. See Netanel, supra note 32, at 393–98 (comparing the robust moral rights regimes of France 
and Germany with the more limited moral rights regime of the United States). 
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harm the reputation of the author, the right of integrity would likely protect 
against any and all alterations. 
As a more general matter, the American moral rights regime would do well 
to consider use-based separability as its guiding normative light. This is because 
separability strikes a compromise allowing moral rights regimes to protect 
authors against unwanted uses that affect them by virtue of their associational 
connection to their work, while providing some flexibility for purchasers of a 
work to use it as they see fit. In particular, use-based separability comes down 
most harshly on uses that the American right of integrity currently protects; 
that is, modifications that lead to reputational harms.188 Further, these uses are 
particularly troubling because the connection between the author and the work 
is exploited, which is the underlying cause of the reputational effects. 
Similarly, a renewed focus on use-based separability also cabins the rights 
of artists in ways that are socially beneficial. Under this view, artists cannot 
control every minute detail of how their work is used, such as whether it must 
be displayed or how it is presented. This flexibility allows purchasers (either 
individuals or museums) to use the work in ways that they value most, provided 
that the use does not leverage the attributional connection that links the artists 
to the work. 
3.  Image and Likeness 
This section addresses the debate over controlling one’s image and 
likeness—particularly as it relates to publicity rights and deepfake technology. 
To begin, this discussion examines the debate over the alienability of rights of 
publicity. Rothman proposes that the right of publicity should be inalienable, 
partly because it is inseparable. 189  However, Rothman’s analysis relies on 
outmoded definitions of separability that were critiqued in Part I. Instead, 
questions about alienability are more nuanced, particularly because separability 
itself is more complicated than previously recognized. More specifically, not all 
uses of personality rights are inseparable. As a result, restrictions on alienability 
should focus on inseparable uses of publicity rights. 
After discussing publicity rights, this section considers the debate over 
deepfakes. By applying use-based separability to this debate, this section casts 
light on a normative justification for continuing control over one’s likeness for 
deepfakes. To that end, certain uses of one’s likeness (usually one’s face) for 
deepfakes has a particularized effect on that person and, therefore, people 
should have the ability to control these uses. 
 
 188. See Lee, supra note 173, at 109. 
 189. Rothman, supra note 18, at 226. 
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a. Rights of Publicity 
The right of publicity—the legal right to control commercial uses of one’s 
name and likeness—is a hybrid creation of both privacy law and property law.190 
Unlike privacy claims that are not assignable, most commentators and courts 
suggest that the right of publicity follows property and, likewise, is fully 
transferrable.191 To that end, a person may transfer their legal rights of control 
over their identity. For example, NBA star Lebron James could assign legal 
rights of control over his identity to another person. In practice, this is not 
wholly uncommon, as the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) 
required (until 2021)192 that student athletes assign their rights of publicity as a 
requirement for participating in collegiate athletics.193 
In an influential article, Rothman resists the tide of unrestrained 
alienability for the right of publicity.194 In particular, Rothman contends that 
restraints on the alienability of publicity rights are justified for a panoply of 
reasons, such as economic efficiency, fundamental rights, and 
anticommodification concerns. 195  More central to this Article, however, 
Rothman also argues that separability warrants restrictions on transfers of these 
rights.196 In particular, Rothman claims that publicity rights cannot be separated 
from the person whose identity it actually is (the “identity-holder” in 
Rothman’s terms).197 As a result, inseparability either “negates the possibility 
of alienability entirely or suggests that publicity rights must be extremely 
limited in nature if they are to be treated as alienable.”198 
Rothman’s use of separability as a normative principle to determine the 
bounds of transferability breaks important new ground. Rothman claims that 
publicity rights are inseparable from the identity holder because the identity 
holder retains the ability to influence the economic value of the right after it is 
transferred; and conversely, the publicity holder maintains the ability to cause 
 
 190. Id. at 205. 
 191. Id. at 186 (“Courts and scholars have routinely described the right of publicity as such a freely 
transferable property right. The leading treatise author in the field, J. Thomas McCarthy, has observed 
that the ‘rule of free assignability in gross of the right of publicity has never been seriously questioned.’” 
(citation omitted) (quoting 2 J. Thomas McCarthy & Roger E. Schechter, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
AND PRIVACY § 10:13 (2011))). 
 192. Evan Gourvitz, INSIGHT: Student-Athletes on Cusp of Compensation with ‘Right of Publicity’ 
Changes, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 20, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-
week/insight-student-athletes-on-cusp-of-compensation-with-right-of-publicity-
changes?context=search&index=3 [https://perma.cc/Z9QS-U6DA]. 
 193. Rothman, supra note 18, at 188. 
 194. Id. at 189–90. 
 195. Id. at 208–20. 
 196. Id. at 234 n.228. 
 197. Id. at 234. 
 198. Id. at 190. 
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both economic harms and dignitary harms to the identity holder.199 As a result, 
Rothman concludes that publicity rights cannot be fully divested from the 
identity holder and should be inalienable.200 
Interestingly, Rothman seems to implicitly adopt a view of separability 
that gives pride of place to uses. Further, an account of separability that focuses 
on uses maps to the spirit of Rothman’s concerns more fully. The heart of 
Rothman’s view of separability is that different uses can implicate the interests 
of the identity holder.201 However, this leads to different results than Rothman 
imagines. As a result, we should not focus on alienability generally but should 
instead fashion use restrictions that limit the ability of the publicity holder to 
create particularized effects on the identity holder. Many, if not all, of 
Rothman’s concerns about the alienability of publicity rights evaporate if the 
identity holder maintains some control over this special class of uses. 
Rothman’s fears are evidenced by her choice of examples. To illustrate the 
problems with the alienability of publicity rights, Rothman points to a lawsuit 
by the estate of Ronald Goldman arguing that Orenthal James (“O.J.”) Simpson 
should be required to assign his publicity rights in order to facilitate payment 
of a $33 million civil judgment against him for the deaths of Goldman and 
Nicole Brown Simpson. 202  According to Rothman, normatively suspect 
consequences follow from this.203 For example, the Goldman family would be 
entitled to produce clothing and posters with O.J. Simpson’s name and face 
alongside the slogan “I Did It.”204 
However, Rothman’s—as well as others’—understanding of separability 
fails to provide determinative criteria for determining when transfers of 
publicity rights are normatively undesirable, and such analysis appears 
necessary. To remedy this shortcoming, we can appeal to separable uses to 
decide these cases. More specifically, Simpson should be able to retain control 
over uses that have a particularized effect on him—again, an effect that is 
specific to him because of his connection to the thing. This way of thinking 
categorizes uses of publicity rights into those that are assignable and those that 
are not. 
 
 199. Id. at 227–28. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 210 (“If alienated, the right of publicity can be used to severely restrict the liberty, free 
speech, and associational rights of identity-holders.”). 
 202. Id. at 200. Ultimately, the district court denied the Goldman’s request to transfer Simpson’s 
publicity rights. Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC036340, 2006 WL 6845603 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 
2006). The judge compared assigning publicity rights to an “involuntary servitude.” Id. at 12. By 
contrast, however, Goldman received the copyright to Simpson’s book—If I Did It: Confessions of the 
Killer (2007)—after filing a motion to assign these rights. Order Granting ex Parte Motion for 
Assignment of Rights and Turnover Order, Goldman, 2007 WL 2455120 (No. SC036340). 
 203. Rothman, supra note 18, at 200. 
 204. Id. at 210–11. 
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Rather than outright restrictions on alienability, the concerns that 
Rothman rightly points out would be better resolved through use restrictions 
based on the theory of separability that this Article offers. Again, separability 
more faithfully tracks its normative commitments when it is viewed through 
the prism of connection and use. Let’s return to Rothman’s examples. The 
Goldman family’s ability to produce T-shirts with Simpson’s face and “I Did 
It” is clearly an inseparable use. More specifically, the Goldmans use a thing 
(Simpson’s face) with a particular connection to Simpson and, further, this use 
affects him uniquely because it is his face attached to the slogan. 
Other uses of Simpson’s personality rights are separable from him. While 
rights of publicity are explicitly about the commercial exploitation of one’s 
likeness, there are still situations where commercially exploiting one’s likeness 
does not lead to particularized effects. For instance, rather than printing T-
shirts with Simpson’s face and a commentary about his actions, the Goldmans 
could have acquired the publicity rights for garden-variety commercial 
purposes. In particular, the Goldmans could have merely collected payments 
for using Simpson’s name to endorse rental car companies or breakfast cereals. 
If there is any effect of this use on Simpson, it is not because of the Goldmans’ 
use of a thing that has a particular connection to him. 
This principle is clarified further by considering the factual scenario 
behind the famous California Supreme Court ruling about rights of publicity in 
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup.205 Comedy III Productions brought a suit 
against artist Gary Saderup because Saderup produced unlicensed charcoal 
drawings of the Three Stooges that he sold as prints and T-shirts.206 However, 
merely producing prints and T-shirts with the Three Stooges image on them is 
separable from them—the effect that producing these items has on the Three 
Stooges does not affect them in virtue of it being their faces depicted. Instead, 
the effect is economic rather than something that is inherent to the connection 
that the Three Stooges have to their image. In light of the separability of this 
particular use, we should have fewer qualms about assigning publicity rights for 
this specific and limited purpose. 
To sum up, restricting uses of publicity rights more adequately accounts 
for potential problems with alienability than fully restricting assignations. 
Moreover, an analysis of connection and use provides a framework for 
determining the content and scope of these use restrictions. In the end, we may 
have worries about the assignability of publicity rights, but separability only 
justifies concerns about some uses, not assignability generally. 
 
 205. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 206. Id. at 800–01. 
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b. Deepfakes 
Deepfakes are digitally falsified media that use cutting-edge techniques to 
produce images, video, or audio that falsely depict a person.207 Deepfakes first 
gained national attention for their use in pornographic videos. 208  More 
specifically, deepfake pornography splices a person’s face—almost always a 
woman’s—into sexually explicit content.209 However, as Bobby Chesney and 
Danielle Citron warn, deepfake technology will likely migrate beyond 
pornography and lead to larger individual and social harm.210 For instance, 
Citron and Chesney describe a case where a deepfake video depicted gun 
control activist Emma Gonzalez tearing apart a copy of the United States 
Constitution.211 In reality, Gonzalez was merely ripping up a gun target adorned 
with a bullseye. Deepfake technology stands to exacerbate the proliferation and 
spread of fake media, particularly in a time where the public trust of media 
institutions hangs in the balance.212 
In response to the looming challenges posed by deepfakes, use-based 
separability provides normative grounding to contest the use of a person’s image 
or likeness in deepfake videos. Again, inseparable uses appropriate the 
particularized connection in a way that effectively uses the person. Additionally, 
thinking through the difficulties ushered in by deepfakes demonstrates the 
effectiveness of separability for making these distinctions. 
Consider again the use of an image of a person’s face for deepfake 
pornography. A person has some connection to an image of their face. There is 
an obvious association between a person and their face, and deepfake 
pornography leverages that connection. As many examples of deepfake 
pornography make clear, a person’s image is often chosen because the creator 
wants it to appear like that specific person appeared in the video. To that end, 
deepfake pornography creators may use an image of an ex-girlfriend (in the case 
of revenge pornography)213 or a celebrity to create an association between that 
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person and the sexually explicit video.214 Importantly, this analysis also extends 
beyond deepfake pornography and would be essentially the same for the case 
involving Emma Gonzalez and other nonpornographic deepfake cases. 
Use-based separability provides a normative justification for giving a 
person control over the use of their image in deepfake videos. Interestingly 
enough, the ability to control images of our faces is incredibly fraught, 
particularly from a privacy perspective.215 The reason for this is that our faces 
are generally displayed to the public; they are not private information.216 As 
discussed earlier, different uses of these images implicate central deontological 
values and, by extension, should be the target of intervention.217 
However, through the lens of use-based separability, not all uses of one’s 
image are equally troubling. Some uses are disconnected from the person and 
do not appear to use the person; thus, they do not violate the prohibition on using 
a person as merely a means to an end. Separability provides a normative 
foundation for only some subset of uses for things that maintain a particularized 
connection to the person. While other uses may be potentially problematic, they 
are not problematic for the deontological reasons that separability identifies. 
Consider some uses that are seemingly separable from the person whose 
image is used. We can imagine a study using deepfakes to see how children 
respond to falsified facial images. Alternatively, using a collection of different 
facial images to test the limits of deepfake technology is seemingly separable as 
well. With these possible uses, the use does not rely on the connection that a 
specific person has to their image. A different person’s image could be 
substituted and the use itself would be unchanged. Put differently, the use does 
not depend on the connection that a specific person has to their image—it merely 
depends on using images of people’s faces. It is worth mentioning that we may 
have significant social reasons to reject any of these uses, but these rationales 
are different than grounding our criticisms on the potential inseparability of 
these uses. 
 
L. REV. 346, 346 (2014). The use of deepfake technology to create revenge pornography is particularly 
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30, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/porn-sites-still-wont-take-down-non-consensual-
deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/9NNF-YG2B]. 
 215. See Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953) (“There can be no privacy in that 
which is already public.” (quoting Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931))). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See supra Section III.A.3.a. 
99 N.C. L REV. 427 (2021) 
2021] INSEPARABLE USES 471 
* * * * * 
Separability provides a normative foundation that helps resolve several 
puzzles in property law. Moreover, focusing on separability creates a regime 
that allows purchasers of contested property to use the thing in ways that 
maximize its value. At the same time, however, separability locates the specific 
interests that people have in virtue of their connection to the thing. Thus, 
separability allows purchasers to use things in ways they deem fit but creates an 
important limitation that protects people’s deontological interests in the thing. 
B. Information Law (Data) 
This section applies separability to longstanding debates within 
information law, particularly the regulation of data. In doing so, this section 
outlines how separability offers a framework for assessing the scope and content 
of use restrictions over personal information. Use restrictions based on 
separability track important deontological commitments. In particular, 
inseparable uses of personal data potentially overlook the dignity of the 
individual and further risk treating the individual as merely a means to an end. 
Additionally, this section uses separability to generate insights about the 
distinction between personal data and de-identified data.218 In particular, this 
discussion applies separability to help demarcate the scope of personal data in 
situations where data contains a semantic link to a small number of people—
but not to a single person. Moreover, use-based separability offers potential 
insights for concerns over the re-identification of anonymized data. Specifically, 
separability provides a system for attaching use restrictions to re-identified data, 
while providing potentially fewer restrictions to uses of de-identified data. 
Separability provides a normative foundation for delineating the scope 
and content of use restrictions over personal data. To start, separability tracks 
values that often shape our collective policy commitments. More specifically, 
uses of personal data that are inseparable risk offending an individual’s dignity 
interests.219 Stated in Kantian terms, inseparable uses fail to fully recognize the 
inherent worth of the individual by using the person as merely a means to an 
end.220 
Use restrictions are necessary for governing personal data because, unlike 
paradigmatic commodities, personal data retains a connection to specific people 
that survives transfer. As such, personal data fails to fit neatly into the standard 
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property paradigm that is reluctant to assess downstream uses. This fact is not 
lost on several privacy scholars. For instance, Lauren Scholz notes that an 
important feature of data is that, unlike typical commodities, it is not fungible 
because it is about particular people or describes their behavior.221 Similarly, 
Julie Cohen balks at the idea that property concepts apply equally well to cars 
and shoes as they do to personal data because personal data describes 
personality. 222  However, privacy scholars have failed to fully craft privacy 
regulations that account for the uniqueness of personal data and the continuing 
connection that links people with their personal data. 
We can resolve this theoretical oversight by building a theory of use 
restrictions around separability. In crafting these use restrictions, the central 
points of analysis are considerations about the connection between the 
information and data subject as well as how the information is used. 
1.  No Connection (De-Identified Data) 
The first point of analysis for crafting use restrictions for information 
based on separability is whether the information retains a connection to a 
person. Many privacy statutes already explicitly recognize the connection 
between a person and information, and privacy statutes often distinguish 
between personal data (which contains a semantic connection to a person) and 
de-identified data (which does not).223 Moreover, the collection or misuse of 
personal data, rather than de-identified data, is a necessary condition for a 
privacy violation under current American privacy law.224 
Although some scholars have recommended abandoning the distinction 
between personal data and de-identified data, use-based separability confirms 
the significance of this distinction.225 De-identified data fails to meet the first 
threshold condition for inseparability; that is, de-identified data does not have 
a continuing connection to a person and, by extension, cannot lead to 
particularized effects. Put differently, uses of de-identified data are necessarily 
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separable.226 As with cars or other paradigmatic commodities that do not retain 
a connection to a person, some uses of de-identified data might affect a specific 
individual.227 However, these effects are not a consequence of any particular 
connection that a person has to de-identified data. Even in cases where de-
identified data leads to effects on individuals, these effects are not a byproduct 
of the connection between the person and thing. 
Moreover, use restrictions are a poor fit for uses of de-identified data 
because individuals do not have an interest in the use of this information in 
virtue of their connection to it. Additionally, potential misuses of de-identified 
data are harder to diagnose ex ante, so use restrictions are likely to be less 
effective than general obligations, such as the duties imposed by tort law. Again, 
that de-identified data is necessarily separable does not mean that all regulation 
is normatively undesirable or that people do not have any legitimate claim to 
contest uses of de-identified data. This claim is merely that de-identified data—
as well as other things that do not have a continuing connection to a person—
are ill-suited for use restrictions founded on inseparability. 
2.  Connection Without Particularized Effect (Personal Data) 
Unlike de-identified data, personal data retains a semantic connection 
linking information with a person. However, there is some inherent fuzziness 
regarding the boundaries of personal data discussed in the next section. In 
particular, some information retains a connection to a small number of people, 
rather than a single individual. This ambiguity has proven to be a stumbling 
block for establishing consensus over the conceptual boundaries of personal 
data.228 Putting these concerns aside for a moment, even when information 
contains a link to several people, a semantic link between a person and the 
information still exists. 
Personal data overcomes the initial threshold condition for inseparability 
because it retains a connection to particular individuals, and this connection can 
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be leveraged to create particularized effects. As a result, some uses of personal 
data are potentially inseparable. 
However, not all uses of personal data necessarily leverage this connection 
to affect the person and, therefore, are separable. Uses of personal data for 
research purposes are commonly separable from specific people. For example, 
smart city initiatives often use personal data in order to improve public 
transit. 229 This often requires examining personal data to create new public 
transportation routes or increase the level of service for specific areas.230 In 
doing so, these initiatives frequently use personal data that is collected through 
Smart Card technology that tracks when and where people use public 
transportation.231 
Nonetheless, these uses are separable from particular people. The use does 
not create effects on particular people in virtue of their connection to the data. 
If anything, the effects of transportation changes may affect people 
individually—through changed commute times or other service changes—but 
this is hardly a result of any particular person’s data.232 Uses of personal data 
that do not lead to particularized effects do not raise the specter of dignity 
violations that undergird the need for use restrictions. As a result, people have 
a weaker interest in controlling these uses of personal data. 
The General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) allows researchers to 
use and process personal data for scientific purposes without the consent of the 
data subject.233 Importantly, the GDPR singles out research as an exception to 
the general requirement that using personal data requires the consent of the 
data subject. 234  While the GDPR does not mention separability as the 
normative justification for this exception, an examination of separable uses 
would reach this result. 
Moreover, the GDPR is careful to prevent personal data obtained for 
research purposes from being used in ways that are inseparable.235 Again, the 
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GDPR does not mention separability, but the exemption for processing data for 
research is limited in that the data cannot be used “in support of measures or 
decisions regarding any particular [individual].” 236  While the next section 
further clarifies the role of inseparability in developing use restrictions over 
data, the GDPR carves out inseparable uses from its research exemption for 
personal data.237 However, rather than appealing to inseparability, the GDPR 
instead frames this use as “measures or decisions” regarding specific people.238 
While the GDPR limits individual control over personal data for research 
purposes, it follows control theories of privacy that largely view personal data 
as the property right of the data subject and allow individuals to control almost 
all secondary uses of their personal data. 239 In addition, within the United 
States, this model of privacy has found many ardent supporters. For instance, 
the Fair Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”) require the consent of the 
data subject before personal data can be transferred or used for a purpose for 
which it was not originally collected.240 
In this same vein, Paul Schwartz suggests a model for data governance 
where the data subject would retain the right to block secondary transfers or 
uses of personal data.241 Schwartz’s proposal does not assess the potential effects 
of the use on the data subject but instead proposes that all secondary uses 
require the consent of the person to whom the data refers.242 Likewise, Jerry 
Kang and Benedikt Buchner argue that a control model coupled with 
inalienability provisions offers a possible path forward for information privacy 
legislation.243 
By contrast to these previous ideas, a model of data governance founded 
on separability would focus use restriction on uses that are inseparable rather 
than creating a blanket consent regime for nearly all secondary uses. At bottom, 
use restrictions based on separability track closely to the interests that a data 
subject has in their personal data while also allowing data controllers to use data 
in socially useful (and separable) ways. To that end, separability provides a 
mechanism for determining when a data subject should be able to control uses 
of their information and when they should have weaker claims for control. 
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3.  Connection with Particularized Effect (Personal Data) 
Use restrictions over personal data should focus on constraining uses that 
are inseparable. Again, inseparable uses leverage the connection that a person 
has to their data and bring about effects on the person based on that connection. 
Put differently, an inseparable use creates effects on a person by virtue of the 
fact that the thing used is connected to them or about them in some way. 
Consider again the example from the previous discussion about Smart 
Card technology and traffic optimization.244 While personal data collected by 
this technology can be used in ways that are separable, it can also be used in 
ways that are inseparable. Rather than using personal data to analyze systemic 
patterns in traffic flow, personal data could be used to identify individuals who 
may have committed a crime based on their location data or to identify 
individuals that potentially evaded paying the fare. Use of personal data for 
these purposes targets specific individuals based on their information and 
creates effects on them because of the content of their personal data. 
However, the use of Smart Card technology for inseparable uses also 
captures another important point—just because use of personal data is 
potentially inseparable does not mean that it should never be used to create 
particularized effects. Rather, inseparability merely locates the specific interests 
that an individual retains over uses of a thing that is connected to them. There 
may be cases where public safety or other concerns outweigh the interest that a 
particular person has in the use of their personal information; striking these 
bargains is inherently a process of political and social negotiation. Nevertheless, 
it is important to recognize that a person still has interests in uses of their 
personal data after it is transferred or shared with a third party. 
Several other uses of personal data within the information economy bring 
about particularized effects on the data subject and are inseparable. Targeting, 
for example, risks inseparability in most cases. Targeting is the practice of 
delivering messages to a specific population of people. 245  Moreover, this 
practice uses personal data—often behavioral data, such as browser history—to 
create individualized profiles that advertisers use to direct messages at specific 
groups of people. 246  Here, the messages that a person receives, and the 
corresponding effects on them, are a product of using their personal data to 
predict their interests. 
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Importantly, targeting is not limited to advertising. 247  Content 
personalization is another form of targeting worth mentioning. For instance, 
Netflix’s recommendation algorithm crunches users’ data about their activity on 
the platform to predict their preferences. 248  Armed with these predictions, 
Netflix recommends specific shows or movies to users in an attempt to match 
their preferences.249 
At bottom, several common uses of personal data are inseparable. In 
particular, when personal data is used to single out specific individuals for some 
action—such as marketing or other decisions including police scrutiny and 
creditworthiness—these uses potentially violate basic deontological values. 
More specifically, these practices potentially use the person as merely a means 
to an end and undermine the person’s inherent dignity. As a result, information 
policy should provide people with legal mechanisms of control over these uses. 
* * * * * 
Separability identifies the specific interests that individuals have in uses 
of information. First, uses of de-identified data do not implicate the values that 
separability protects. This is because the connection between the person and 
the information is severed during the de-identification process.250 Second, some 
uses of personal data are separable from the data subject. Here, a person retains 
a connection to the data, but the use does not affect them by virtue of that 
connection. Again, individuals have weaker claims to contest these uses. Finally, 
some uses of personal information appropriate the personal connection inherent 
in the data and affect the individual. These uses are inseparable and potentially 
violate deontological principles, and therefore, individuals should have legal 
mechanisms of control over these uses. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article grounds the debate over downstream restrictions of personal 
data and other contested commodities in philosophical first principles. 
However, there is still difficult—though ultimately necessary—work required 
to translate inseparability as a conceptual and normative framework into actual 
legislation. Put another way, although a focus on inseparable uses identifies a 
person’s interest in uses of things that they no longer control, this does not lead 
inexorably to specific regulatory choices. 
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There are a few guideposts that could assist with this translational work. 
First, although inseparability does not turn on whether the secondary users 
intended to affect the person who is connected to the thing, intent could still 
provide a legislative focal point to craft legal rules protecting inseparability and, 
by extension, the deontological interests that inseparability serves. Potential 
legislation could prioritize extending control to people where an individual uses 
a thing downstream in a way that they intend to affect the person. Of course, 
proving intent is sometimes challenging, but other bodies of law routinely 
employ intent to determine the existence of a legal wrong.251 
Second, potential legislation could attempt to distinguish between the 
different types of connection that persist between an individual and a thing. 
Here, regulators might prioritize specific connections that are more significant 
and deserving of legal protection. For instance, is the connection that a person 
retains to their genetic information more significant than the connection that 
links a painter to her finished artwork? The use-based account of separability 
sketched in this Article largely sidesteps considerations over the strength of 
connections because separability merely requires that a connection persist after 
transfer. A similar strategy is implicitly employed in current privacy regulation 
where legislation singles out particularly “sensitive” information for 
protection. 252  Ultimately, decisions over which connections justify greater 
control over uses that appropriate that connection will be contested, yet it still 
remains a promising avenue to implement considerations of separability. 
This Article provides a philosophical grounding to the debate regarding 
limits of control over personal information and other unique things that retain 
a connection to specific people after transfer. A renewed focus on separability 
affords clear opportunities for conceptual and normative clarity across several 
distinct areas of law, yet the difficult process of translating theory to practice 
remains. However, the benefits of implementing separability as a normative 
guidepost greatly exceed the costs of this work. In other words, the painting is 
“well worth the oils.”253 
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